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ADMINISTRATIVE PROXIES FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW:
BUILDING LEGITIMACY FROM THE INSIDE-OUT
Emily Hammond* & David L. Markell**
Judicial review is considered an indispensible legitimizer of the administrative
state.  Not only is it a hallmark feature of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”),
but the various standards of review reinforce democratic norms, promote accountabil-
ity, and act as a check against arbitrariness.  Unreviewable agency actions, therefore,
must find their legitimacy elsewhere.  This article evaluates the promise of “inside-out”
legitimacy as an alternative or complement to judicial review.  We theorize, based on
insights from the administrative law and procedural justice literatures, that administra-
tive process design can do much to advance legitimacy without the need to rely on
judicial review to check administrative decisionmaking.  Next, we connect the theoreti-
cal conceptions of legitimacy to administrative behavior by offering metrics for testing
intrinsic legitimacy.  To demonstrate how these metrics might be applied, we present an
empirical study of an innovative administrative fire-alarm process that enables inter-
ested parties to petition the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to withdraw
states’ authorization to administer the major environmental statutes.  While this process
may trigger a variety of responses by EPA, there is generally little recourse to the courts
for citizens dissatisfied with the process or its outcomes.  Our findings suggest that, even
without external checks, EPA engages in numerous behaviors indicative of intrinsic le-
gitimacy.  In addition, the process itself produces real substantive outcomes.  Armed
with these findings, we conclude with an assessment of institutional design features that
may contribute to inside-out legitimacy.
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INTRODUCTION
Judicial review is considered a critical legitimizer of the administrative
state. In fact, it is hard to overstate the prominence that role takes — whether
expressed by statute,1 judicial opinion,2 or in the academic literature.3  There are
good reasons for this view; agencies are uncomfortably positioned in the tri-
partite constitutional structure, and the rigors of judicial scrutiny can further
democratic accountability and otherwise incentivize legitimizing behaviors.
But much of the real work of administrative agencies never comes before
a court.  As an initial matter, the time and resources needed to maintain a suit
1 E.g., Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–06 (2006).
2 E.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 489 (1951) (“The legislative history [of
the APA] demonstrates a purpose to impose on courts a responsibility which has not always been
recognized.”).
3 E.g., M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1413
(2004) (“The dominant narrative of modern administrative law casts judges as key players who
help tame, and thereby legitimate, the exercise of administrative power.”).
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against a federal agency, coupled with the many deferential standards of re-
view, require potential litigants to carefully evaluate whether bringing a chal-
lenge would be worthwhile.4  Even presuming a willing litigant, review may
not be available for a variety of reasons.  Congress sometimes forecloses re-
view,5 and constitutional doctrines, like standing, may have the same impact.6
Further, many agency policies, such as those expressed in guidance documents
and interpretive rules, can be extraordinarily difficult to bring before a court,
particularly on pre-enforcement challenges.7  Moreover, numerous scholars
have raised the concern that agencies can strategically avoid judicial review by
choosing policymaking vehicles that take advantage of the many
nonreviewability doctrines.8
How can the heavy reliance on judicial review for administrative legiti-
macy be squared with the fact that so many agency decisions are never checked
by a court?  This issue, one of the great paradoxes in administrative law, raises
an obvious question: What else is there to legitimize unreviewable agency ac-
tion?  Some scholars who have examined this question have proposed demo-
cratic oversight — especially through the President9 and Congress10 — to
supply legitimacy.  But there is little question that much of what agencies do
receives sparse scrutiny from either the President or Congress because of the
volume of work involved and the realities of time, resource, and financial
constraints.11
4 For the classic litigant-driven theory of how disputes are selected for litigation, see generally
George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1984).
5 E.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 701(a)(1)–(2) (providing exceptions to reviewability).
6 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (calling the standing require-
ment an “irreducible constitutional minimum”).
7 A number of requirements limit or preclude review. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 702 (agency action
requirement); id. (zone-of-interests requirement); id. § 704 (finality requirement); Abbott Labs. v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967) (ripeness).
8 See, e.g., Bryan Clark & Amanda C. Leiter, Regulatory Hide and Seek: What Agencies Can (And
Can’t) Do to Limit Judicial Review, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1687, 1694 (2011) (suggesting agency manip-
ulation of reviewability doctrines “poses a . . . threat to congressional authority and executive
legitimacy”); Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking,
92 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 408 (2007) (“by issuing a guidance document, an agency can obtain a
rule-like effect while minimizing political oversight and avoiding the procedural discipline, public
participation, and judicial accountability required by the APA”); Mark Seidenfeld, Substituting
Substantive for Procedural Review of Guidance Documents, 90 TEX. L. REV. 331 (2011–2012)
(proposing arbitrary-and-capricious review and modifications to finality and ripeness doctrines to
counteract potential agency abuse of less participatory and reviewable policy tools); Jim Rossi, Of
Dialogue — and Democracy — in Administrative Law, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 147,
150–51 (2012) (suggesting agencies might choose policymaking tools strategically to avoid dia-
logue with courts); cf. Emily Hammond Meazell, Dialogue, Deferred and Differentiated, 112
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 185, 192 (2012) (noting dialogue may be available elsewhere).  Of
course, courts and many scholars have also expressed concerns about the potential negative im-
pacts of judicial review, one of us included. See infra note 91. R
9 See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001).
10 See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, The Turn Toward Congress in Administrative Law, 89 B.U. L.
REV. 727 (2009).
11 Furthermore, scholars have demonstrated the weaknesses of these models to the extent they
depend on notions of political accountability for their legitimacy. E.g., Edward Rubin, The Myth
of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2076–98 (2005)
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Despite these shortcomings of external oversight, the intrinsic legitimacy
of agency behavior — legitimacy from the inside-out12 — is both under-theo-
rized and under-empiricized.13  Professors Sidney A. Shapiro and Ronald F.
Wright observe that, “with only a few exceptions . . . administrative law schol-
ars treat agencies as a black box to be controlled from the outside, using politi-
cal oversight and judicial review.”14  There is, however, increasing recognition
that the vast world of governance that agencies inhabit with relative policymak-
ing freedom deserves close attention, accompanied by the recognition that com-
binations of internal and external controls may best optimize administrative
legitimacy.15  Indeed, declining levels of trust in government institutions high-
light the importance of considering administrative legitimacy from many
angles.16
This Article contributes to both the theory and the empirical analysis of
inside-out legitimacy.  To develop the theoretical foundation, it begins by ex-
amining more precisely the means by which judicial review accomplishes its
legitimacy-enhancing role, with a particular emphasis on the reasoned-decision-
making requirement.17  At their core, the various principles of judicial review
reinforce administrative law values of participation, deliberation, and trans-
parency, which guard against arbitrariness and foster accountability.18  As we
(contending electoral accountability is a myth and therefore cannot legitimize federal govern-
ment); Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1267–71
(2009) (demonstrating voters’ inability to link specific policy decisions to congresspeople or Presi-
dent and to sanction such officials by voting).
12 We use the terminology advanced by Professors Shapiro and Wright. See Sidney A. Shapiro &
Ronald F. Wright, The Future of the Administrative Presidency: Turning Administrative Law In-
side-Out, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 578 (2011) (defining inside-out legitimacy).
13 There is often an assumption in the literature that judicial review is necessary to agency legiti-
macy. E.g., Jessica Mantel, Procedural Safeguards for Agency Guidance: A Source of Legitimacy
for the Administrative State, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 343, 399 (2009) (describing prospect of judicial
review for proposed procedural reforms in creating guidance documents); Mark Seidenfeld, A
Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1561 (1992)
(describing role for courts as external check on agency procedural approaches to civic
republicanism).
14 See Shapiro & Wright, supra note 12, at 580.  Notably, the field of public administration has R
contributed much more to the study of inner agency workings than has administrative law. See id.
at 597–603 (detailing public administration literature).
15 Id. at 579 (“democracies can, under the right conditions, depend on inside-out controls to com-
plement outside-in controls and promote accountability”); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Be-
yond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
461, 555–56 (2003) [hereinafter Arbitrariness] (arguing for renewed focus on “ordinary” admin-
istrative law as opposed to constitutional administrative law).
16 See Rebecca Bratspies, Regulatory Trust, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1364314, at 579
(2009) (collecting sources for declining levels of trust); Tom R. Tyler, Public Mistrust of the Law:
A Political Perspective, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 847, 856 (1998) (describing role of trust in perceptions
of legitimacy for government institutions); see also Trust in Government in Washington Remains
Low, PEW RESEARCH CTR., http://www.pewresearch.org/daily-number/trust-in-government-in-
washington-remains-low/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2013) (“Only about a quarter of Americans say
they trust the federal government to do the right thing all or most of the time.”).
17 See infra Part I.B.
18 By administrative law values, we mean widely accepted norms for administrative legitimacy.
See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Disciplining Delegation After Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’n,
87 CORNELL L. REV. 452, 460 (2002) (listing democratic values for administrative state of ac-
countability, fairness, rationality, and regularity); David L. Markell, “Slack” in the Administrative
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also note, these principles are consistent with the literature on procedural jus-
tice, which evaluates the legitimacy of decision-making procedures based on
norms of voice, respect, neutrality, and trust.19  Overall, these principles legiti-
mize by affirming citizenship, reinforcing fidelity to statute, and furthering
democratic norms.
But what do these conceptions of legitimacy have to offer for evaluating
the legitimacy of unreviewable agency actions?  We propose that the insights
from judicial review can be used to develop metrics for evaluating administra-
tive governance in action more generally.  These metrics include: how an ad-
ministrative process is used; the agency’s responsiveness and reason-giving;
and the substantive outcomes reached.  Each metric draws on the theoretical
conceptions of agency legitimacy as furthered by judicial review, but each is
tailored to evaluating that legitimacy from the inside-out.
We test our metrics empirically by applying them to an agency procedure
that typically evades judicial review: petitions to withdraw states’ authority to
administer environmental statutes.  To elaborate, the major federal environmen-
tal statutes, notably the Clean Air Act (“CAA”),20 Clean Water Act
(“CWA”),21 and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”),22 are
based on a cooperative federalism structure.  Under this structure, EPA is
charged with implementing the federal regulatory programs, but the states are
authorized to serve as nearly full partners by taking over implementation of the
programs, subject to federal approval and oversight.23  In addition to monitoring
state performance, EPA has the power to withdraw the state’s authorization if
the state is inadequately implementing the environmental laws.  But the federal
agency has almost never done so.24  Scholars, agency officials, states and inter-
State and its Implications for Governance: The Issue of Accountability, 84 OR. L. REV. 1, 23
(2005) [hereinafter Slack] (raising concerns of less transparency and accountability in environ-
mental cooperative federalism); Emily Hammond Meazell, Deference and Dialogue in Adminis-
trative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1722, 1729 (2011) [hereinafter Dialogue] (noting role of courts
in furthering such values).
19 Tom Tyler & David Markell, The Public Regulation of Land-Use Decisions: Criteria for Evalu-
ating Alternative Procedures, 7 J. EMPIR. LEGAL STUD. 538, 548 (2010); Tom R. Tyler, Social
Justice, Outcome and Procedure, 35 INT’L J. OF PSYCHOL. 117, 121 (2000); see also Rebecca
Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the Federal Courts, 46 HASTINGS
L.J. 127, 136 (2012) (collecting further sources).
20 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7401–7671q (2006)).
21 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006)).
22 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2006).
23 CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & DAVID L. MARKELL, REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCE-
MENT & THE STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP 15–16 (2003).  Congress has adopted a cooperative
federalism approach across a range of policy areas. See e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act,
29 U.S.C. § 667 (2006) (permitting states to assume responsibility for occupational safety and
health standards, provided conditions are met); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30
U.S.C. § 1253 (2006) (similar for surface coal mining and reclamation operations).
24 Cf. Final Rule, Partial Withdrawal of Approval of 34 Clean Air Act Part 70 Operating Permits
Programs in California, 67 Fed. Reg. 63551 (Oct. 15, 2002) (partially withdrawing California’s
Title V authority); Announcement of a Federal Operating Permits Program Consistent with 40
C.F.R. Part 71, 66 Fed. Reg. 63236 (Dec. 5, 2001) (announcing Maryland would lose its interim
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est groups agree that formal withdrawal is an exceedingly unlikely cure for the
malady of inadequate state performance.25
In addition to the limitations of resource constraints, EPA’s oversight of
state performance has been complicated by the design choices inherent in coop-
erative federalism and the realities of managing a large bureaucratic structure.26
Both the Government Accountability Office and the EPA Office of Inspector
General (“OIG”) have identified EPA oversight of states as a “management
challenge” for the past several fiscal years.27  According to the OIG, these chal-
lenges are exacerbated by inconsistent and incomplete data, unclear and con-
flicting state performance benchmarks, variations in the stringency of regional
oversight of states, and regional failure to curtail weak or variable enforcement
by the states.28
EPA, however, is not the only actor tasked with ensuring compliance with
the environmental regulatory programs.  Citizens and other interested parties
are also specifically empowered to influence government and regulated party
behavior, and one way to do so is to petition EPA to withdraw state authority.
This innovative fire-alarm mechanism has the potential to convey important
information to EPA about state performance, as well as to signal concerns about
state performance and regional oversight to EPA headquarters, Congress, and
other stakeholders.  Yet EPA has proved reluctant to withdraw a state’s author-
ity even in response to petitions.  And because decisions whether to initiate
withdrawal are within EPA’s enforcement discretion, the agency’s responses to
such petitions largely go unreviewed.29
Standing as the petition process does at the crossroads of administrative
law, cooperative federalism, and environmental law, much is at stake.  Perhaps
surprisingly, then, this process has never been studied empirically; unlike no-
tice-and-comment rulemaking, for example (which is largely reviewable in any
event), lessons of administrative legitimacy to be gleaned from the petition pro-
cess are waiting to be uncovered.30  The process typically lacks the check of
judicial review and has generally evaded congressional31 and presidential32
approval status of its state Title V permitting program on Dec. 1, 2001, but would gain full delega-
tion of authority to implement federal permitting program on that same date).
25 See infra text accompanying notes 106–114. R
26 One of us has detailed the many information disconnects between the states and EPA that hinder
transparency and accountability. See generally Markell, Slack, supra note 18. R
27 EPA Office of Inspector General, EPA Must Improve Oversight of State Enforcement, Report
No. 12-P-0113, at 32 (Dec. 9, 2011) [hereinafter OIG Report].
28 Id. at 11–15.
29 See infra text accompanying notes 150–171 (detailing unreviewability). R
30 Cf. Cary Coglianese, Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Future, 55 DUKE
L.J. 943 (2006) (suggesting citizen participation in rulemakings is sparse, even with e-rulemaking
technologies); Mariano-Florentino Cue´llar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV.
411 (2005) (evaluating type and content of participation in such rulemakings); Cynthia Farina,
Mary Newhart & Josiah Heidt, Rulemaking vs. Democracy: Judging and Nudging Participation
that Counts, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 123 (2012) (examining effect and value of mass
comments for technology-enabled rulemaking).
31 Our research revealed only a few discussions of petitions to withdraw in congressional testi-
mony. See, e.g., Federal-State Relationship: Environmental Self Audits: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong.  9–10, 39, 46, 53, 58, 63, 86, 96 (1998) (discussing withdraw-
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oversight, but it goes to the very heart of how major regulatory schemes are
managed.  Even though EPA has never withdrawn a state’s authority in re-
sponse to a petition, our study, which evaluates a full set of petitions to with-
draw over a twenty-five-year period, reveals that the process has enjoyed
sustained use over that time.33  In addition, petitions frequently result in mea-
surable changes in how states administer the environmental regulatory pro-
grams — providing a fascinating, counter-intuitive story about agency behavior
and legitimacy.34
Our hope is to contribute to the literature on legitimacy in several ways.
First, we respond to recent calls for bringing an emphasis on inside-out legiti-
macy to the conversation about administrative law.  Second, we offer a frame-
work for conceptualizing inside-out legitimacy that relies on the lessons of
judicial review for insights.  Third, we propose specific metrics for evaluating
inside-out legitimacy that incorporate the theoretical framework in a pragmatic
way.  Fourth, we apply our metrics to the petition-to-withdraw process, ena-
bling us to assess our conceptual framework and metrics for evaluating legiti-
macy.  Finally, the framework and methodology developed here provide a solid
foundation for further study and raise provocative questions about the ability to
incorporate inside-out features that incentivize legitimizing behavior into insti-
tutional design.  We include some tentative thoughts on what features of the
petition process may have a bearing on its intrinsic legitimacy, and how those
features might be translated to other contexts to bolster inside-out legitimacy.
We also expect this Article to attract attention for its focus on the petition
process itself.  To provide a brief preview, our study raises several questions
about the adequacy of state performance, the efficacy of EPA oversight, and the
effectiveness of the petition process as a check on each.  Despite these and
other criticisms, our overall assessment of the process suggests that EPA has
operated relatively consistently with our metrics for administrative legitimacy.
In particular, EPA’s responsiveness and reason-giving reflect considerable inter-
nalization of legitimacy principles.  And even though it is exceedingly rare for
the agency to pursue withdrawal, our study documents measurable substantive
changes in critical areas such as state law and state agency permitting, investi-
gations, and enforcement.  These findings surprised and impressed us.  We
hope that our effort to create and apply clear legitimacy metrics will stimulate a
als); Enforcement of Environmental Laws: Hearing before the Sen. Comm. on Env’t and Pub.
Works, 105th Cong. 161, 175, 206, 215, 223, 226 (1997) (discussing withdrawals).
32 Unlike rulemaking, the process is not subject to review by the Office of Information and Regu-
latory Affairs (“OIRA”). See Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 6, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted as
amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 745 (2006), and 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 108 (Supp. IV 2010);
see also Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011) (supplementing and reaffirm-
ing the “principles, structures, and definitions . . . established in” Executive Order 12,866); Emily
Hammond Meazell, Presidential Control, Expertise, and the Deference Dilemma, 61 DUKE L.J.
1763, 1794 (2012) [hereinafter Deference Dilemma] (“The typical account of OIRA describes it
as one of the most important means by which the president exercises control over the executive
agencies.”).
33 See infra Part III.A (describing extent of use).
34 See infra Part III.C (describing substantive outcomes).
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conversation about inside-out legitimacy in the specific context of that process,
and lead to progress in making the cooperative federalism system more trans-
parent, accountable, and effective in accomplishing its statutory objectives.
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I establishes the theoretical frame-
work.  It identifies and describes how the prominent doctrines of judicial re-
view of administrative agencies enhance legitimacy of the administrative state.
Next, it proposes metrics for inside-out legitimacy that borrow from the in-
sights of judicial review.  In Part II, we lay the groundwork for the empirical
component of the Article by setting forth the parameters of environmental co-
operative federalism, describing our dataset, and contouring the petition pro-
cess and how it usually evades judicial review.  Part III begins by applying our
legitimacy metrics from Part I to the petition process described in Part II.  Next,
we critique the petition process in light of the norms underlying our metrics.  In
Part IV, we provide some preliminary thoughts on what our study suggests for
institutional design and inside-out legitimacy more broadly.  We conclude by
inviting further exploration of this important facet of administrative law.
I. AGENCY LEGITIMACY
This section briefly sets forth the APA structure for judicial review before
detailing how such review provides legitimacy to the administrative state.35  Al-
though judicial review is imperfect and often unavailable, there is little litera-
ture on how to measure agency legitimacy in the absence of that review.  As
elaborated at the conclusion of this section, we suggest that the theoretical un-
derpinnings of judicial review can be used to develop metrics for gauging
agency legitimacy more broadly.
A. The APA
As those familiar with the APA know, a major component of that statute is
its section providing for judicial review.  Indeed, part of the APA’s original
purpose was to ensure recourse to the courts as a check on agency behavior.36
The statute thus reflects a “basic presumption” in favor of judicial review.37
Nevertheless, it also contemplates that some agency decisions will be exempt
from review.  Congress might expressly or impliedly preclude review in an
35 We use the word “legitimacy” broadly. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency
Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1657, 1675 n.92 (2004) [hereinafter
Inaction].
36 See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140–41 (1967) (“The legislative material elucidat-
ing that seminal act manifests a congressional intention that it cover a broad spectrum of adminis-
trative actions, and this Court has echoed that theme by noting that the Administrative Procedure
Act’s ‘generous review provisions’ must be given a ‘hospitable’ interpretation.”) (citations
omitted).
37 Id. at 140; McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 483–84 (1991) (restrictively
interpreting statutory preclusion of judicial review and permitting claim to go forward).
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agency’s statutory mandate,38 for example, or the type of agency action itself
might be unreviewable because there is no law to apply.39  As the Supreme
Court held in Heckler v. Chaney, the latter category includes an entire class of
agency decisions: “an agency’s decision not to take enforcement action should
be presumed immune from judicial review under § 701(a)(2).”40
Even though some agency behavior is insulated from judicial review by
congressional design, the usual presumption in favor of review reflects deeply
held notions about the courts’ role in administrative law.  A quick look at the
standards of review set forth in § 706 of the APA demonstrates this: courts
ensure that agencies carry out their mandatory duties,41 follow proper proce-
dures,42 engage in reasonable analyses,43 obey the Constitution,44 and act only
within the confines of their statutory mandates.45  These checks were put in
place partly in response to the New Deal — at a time when agencies enjoyed
expanding powers and discretionary authority, meaningful review was consid-
ered necessary to preserve agencies’ constitutional legitimacy and to otherwise
serve as a check on their exercises of power.46  Since then, the courts them-
selves have imbued the APA with much more meaning than the statute’s lan-
guage might suggest — and in ways that provide considerable insights for
administrative legitimacy.
B. Judicial Review’s Mechanisms for Enhancing Legitimacy
The various judicial elaborations of administrative law are, in fact,
uniquely tailored to addressing considerations of legitimacy.  Before discussing
those elaborations, it is worth emphasizing that one way judicial review adds
legitimacy to administrative actions is by providing a third-party imprimatur of
38 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (no judicial review where “statutes preclude judicial review”); see Block
v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 347 (1984) (holding statute’s structure evidenced congres-
sional intent to preclude review of milk market orders in suits brought by consumers).
39 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (no judicial review where “agency action is committed to agency discre-
tion by law”); see Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (“The
legislative history of the Administrative Procedure Act indicates that [this exemption] is applica-
ble in those rare instances where ‘statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there
is no law to apply.’”) (citation omitted).  Numerous other reviewability requirements may be
found in the APA. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 702 (agency action requirement); id. (zone-of-interests
requirement); id. § 704 (finality requirement).  The Constitution also limits review. See U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2 (case or controversy requirement); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560 (1992) (“the core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-
or-controversy requirement of Article III”).
40 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).
41 5 U.S.C. § 706(1).
42 Id. § 706(2)(D).
43 Id. §§ 706(2)(A), (E).
44 Id. § 706(2)(B).
45 Id. § 706(2)(C).
46 See Peter L. Strauss, Legislation that Isn’t — Attending to Rulemaking’s “Democracy Deficit,”
98 CAL. L. REV. 1351, 1357 (2010) (“The legitimacy of delegated discretionary authority, that is,
is tied directly to the possibility of judicial review for the rationality of its exercise.”).  For an
overview of this history, see Meazell, Dialogue, supra note 18, at 1735–37. R
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approval for agency behavior.47  While the courts’ status as independent third-
party reviewers contributes to their capacity to serve this legitimizing role, also
important is the actual review courts undertake.  Rather than review agency
actions based on norms generated in an ad hoc way, courts add legitimacy to
agency action because of their approach — notably, their inquiry into whether
an agency’s performance met relevant standards.
We focus here on the details of those standards, which operate as legiti-
mizing mechanisms when courts review agencies’ procedures, substantive rea-
soning, and conformity with statute.48  To show why and how those
mechanisms work, we draw from the literature on administrative law values
(which includes participation, deliberation, and transparency);49 procedural jus-
tice (which includes voice, neutrality, trust, and respect);50 and the primacy of
statutory authority.  Taken together, these attributes represent democratic norms
that distinguish a legitimate state from an autocratic or authoritarian one.
1. Procedure
When courts review agency actions for conformance to procedural re-
quirements, the starting point is the language of the APA and the requirements
it imposes on various agency actions.51  The requirements, however, are far
more robust as a result of judicial interpretation than the text of the APA might
suggest.  In the rulemaking context, for example, the APA requires agencies to
“give interested persons an opportunity to participate,” consider “the relevant
matter presented,” and accompany rules with a “concise . . . statement of basis
and purpose.”52  As interpreted by the courts, this means that agencies must
provide the scientific and technical details on which their proposed rules are
based in order to allow meaningful commentary.53 Agencies must respond to
significant points raised by commenters,54 and any changes that are not the
logical outgrowth of such proposed rules require new rounds of notice and
47 See Frank Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of Rulemaking, 85 VA. L. REV.
1243, 1281–82 (1999) (collecting sources).
48 Constitutional compliance is beyond the scope of this Article.  For an analysis of some of the
issues, see Gillian Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 479 (2010).
49 See supra note 18. R
50 See supra note 19. R
51 Of course, statutory mandates may also require more specificity than does the text of the APA.
See, e.g., Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(3)(A)–(C) (2006) (mandating
statement of basis and purpose include factual data, methodology, and legal interpretations and
policy considerations underlying rule).
52 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
53 Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckleshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see also Engine
Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 20 F.3d 1177, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“[A] reasonable explanation . . .
would be one that the concerned public could understand.”).
54 See Reytblatt v. NRC, 105 F.3d 715, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“An agency need not address every
comment, but it must respond in a reasoned manner to those that raise significant problems.”);
Home Box Office v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“To this end there must be an ex-
change of views, information, and criticism between interested persons and the agency.”);  Cue´l-
lar, supra note 30, at 421 n.37. R
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comment.55  Resulting statements of basis and purpose, therefore, tend to be
“monstrously long and complex document[s].”56
Why impose such burdens on agencies, particularly with so little textual
support for doing so?57  One prominent view is that they reinforce notions of
legitimacy.  First, they are consistent with participation and voice — attributes
considered fundamental to democratic decisionmaking58 as well as to the per-
ceived legitimacy of process.59  Second, they encourage and reward deliberation
and responsiveness.  The former furthers neutrality and protects against arbi-
trariness and extreme outcomes by slowing the pace of decisionmaking and
bringing the benefits of dialogue to bear on proposed agency actions.60  The
latter fosters trust and demonstrates that participants in the process were treated
with respect.61  Finally, these procedural rules are important building blocks for
one of administrative law’s ultimate legitimizers: reasoned decisionmaking.62
2. Reason-Giving
The reasoned-decisionmaking requirement is by far the most impactful ju-
dicial elaboration of administrative law.  Its textual support stems from the
55 Ober v. EPA, 84 F.3d 304, 313 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that EPA violated the CAA and the APA
by accepting and partly relying on 300 additional pages of post-comment information from an
interested party without reopening comment period).
56 GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 359 (2013).
57 We acknowledge the many criticisms of such rules, as well as the tension they create with
Vermont Yankee. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, 435
U.S. 519, 525 (1978) (holding courts may not impose procedures on agencies beyond those set
forth in the APA or required by the Constitution); Jack M. Beermann & Gary Lawson, Reproces-
sing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 894 (2007) (arguing these rules turn “the
notice of proposed rulemaking into something akin to proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law”).
58 David Arkush, Democracy and Administrative Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. —, at 9
(forthcoming 2013) (arguing democratic legitimacy model of administrative law “envisions a high
degree of citizen participation in the administrative process”); Staszewski, supra note 11, at 1253 R
(“[T]he legitimacy of governmental authority in a democracy is often thought to depend upon the
consent of the governed.”).
59 See Lisa B. Bingham, Self-Determination in Dispute System Design and Employment Arbitra-
tion, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 873, 907 (2002) (describing the link between participation and legiti-
macy in the context of binding arbitration); Bratspies, supra note 16, at 615 (suggesting active R
solicitation of plural voices furthers legitimacy for administrative agencies); Jim Rossi, Participa-
tion Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW.
U. L. REV. 173, 182 (1997) (“Citizen involvement in agency decisions also reinforces procedural-
ist goals and helps to create and affirm citizenship.”). For a full discussion of the various theories
of participation, see id., at 180–88; cf. JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, STEALTH
DEMOCRACY: AMERICANS’ BELIEFS ABOUT HOW GOVERNMENT SHOULD WORK 1–2, 7 (2002) (ar-
guing active participation is less important to citizens than that political decision makers be
neutral).
60 See Sidney A. Shapiro, Elizabeth Fisher & Wendy E. Wagner, The Enlightenment of Adminis-
trative Law: Looking Inside the Agency for Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 463, 470 (2013)
(“A deliberative dialogue is transformative in nature because different actors can learn from the
process and reconsider their perspectives.”).
61 See Tyler & Markell, supra note 19, at 548 (detailing these principles). R
62 See Am. Med. Ass’n v. Reno, 57 F.3d 1129, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (explaining that procedural
requirements for notice and comment rulemaking “serve important purposes of agency accounta-
bility and reasoned decisionmaking”).
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APA’s substantial evidence63 and arbitrary and capricious64 standards of re-
view;65 its judicial gloss takes the form of “hard-look” review.66  That is, the
agency must consider all the statutorily relevant factors67 and draw a rational
connection between the facts and the ultimate decision.68  Furthermore, the
agency’s reasoning must be apparent from the record, which is in turn defined
as anything the agency had before it when making its decision.69  Taken to-
gether, the reason-giving and record requirements are meant to ensure that the
agency “shows its work,” which facilitates external, as well as internal,
legitimacy.
To understand why, it is helpful to begin with the origins of hard-look
review.  The standard arose out of two developments: in the early 1970s, agen-
cies began exercising unprecedented rulemaking authority under the broad
delegations of authority in environmental, health and safety statutes;70 but at the
same time, the interest-group capture model of agency behavior suggested that
agencies were not necessarily acting to protect statutory beneficiaries when
they exercised this authority.71  A searching review of agency behavior enabled
responses to both these developments.  First, hard-look review is recognized as
a counter-balance to broad delegations of authority, helping offset constitu-
63 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2006).
64 Id. § 706 (2)(A).
65 As others note, the reason-giving requirement also applies under Chevron step two. See Lisa
Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549, 585 (2009) (“[T]he effect of each is
much the same.”); Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1253, 1296 (1997) (predicting increasing overlap between step two and arbitrariness
review); cf. Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 Va. L.
Rev. 597, 603–04 (2009) (condensing Chevron into principle that courts must uphold any reasona-
ble agency construction); see also Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron’s Foundation, 86 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 273, 310–11 (2011) (arguing step two serves Article III function independent of § 706 of
APA).
66 There is significant variety in the extent to which courts scrutinize agencies under this standard.
See Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and Judicial Review of
Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733, 778–84 (2011) [hereinafter Super Deference] (docu-
menting extremely deferential judicial review of legislative science); Sidney A. Shapiro & Rich-
ard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of Administrative
Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 1064–66 (1995) (describing the “proliferation of manipulable cate-
gories to which different degrees of deference apply”).
67 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971); see Massachusetts v.
EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534 (2007) (remanding EPA decision not to regulate greenhouse gases under
Clean Air Act where decision was based in part on factors not contemplated by statutory scheme).
68 Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1982).
69 Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420; cf. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 407–08 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(permitting ex parte contacts during notice-and-comment rulemaking, with proviso that “the Ad-
ministrator may not base the rule in whole or in part on any ‘information or data’ which is not in
the record, no matter what the source.”).
70 For an account of these changes and their relationship to judicial review, see Meazell, Super
Deference, supra note 66, at 756–59. R
71 For an account of hard-look review as a response to the interest-group capture model, see Mark
Seidenfeld, The Irrelevance of Politics in Hard-Look Review, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 148–49 (2012)
[hereinafter Irrelevance].
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tional legitimacy concerns by acting as a check on discretion.72  Second, hard-
look review ensures a baseline fidelity to the statutory mandate; even if agen-
cies have close relationships with regulated entities (or other stakeholders), a
careful look by a court helps ensure that the agency’s action is at least within
the range of possible options that the applicable statute permits.73
Thus, reason-giving furthers the external accountability and legitimacy
that courts provide by supplying a transparent decision for review.  It facilitates
oversight more broadly, however, because it permits other stakeholders —
Congress, the executive, regulated entities, and regulatory beneficiaries — to
understand the agency’s justifications and hold it accountable for its decisions.74
In this way, the transparency of reason-giving enables democratic oversight,
helping ensure agencies’ legitimacy in the constitutional scheme.
But reason-giving does more than facilitate external oversight.  It also pro-
motes intrinsic legitimacy.75  First, it provides a disciplining check on deci-
sionmakers, protecting against arbitrariness and evidencing a commitment to
rationality.76  As Professor Glen Staszewski explains, it does so by requiring
agencies to explain why their decisions are good for the public as a whole, as
72 Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653,
655–56 (1985) (describing judicial review as a surrogate safeguard of agency legitimacy after the
demise of the nondelegation doctrine).
73 Mass., 549 U.S. at 534; Eric Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin: Judicial Review of Administra-
tive Agency Action and Inaction, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 461, 468 (2008) (noting that a key reason for
reviewability is to maintain statutory supremacy); Meazell, Deference Dilemma, supra note 32, at R
1769 (describing judicial review as furthering fidelity to statute); Seidenfeld, Irrelevance, supra
note 71, at 156 (emphasizing centrality of statutory mandate over political factors); Sunstein, R
supra note 72, at 655 (“Judicial review serves important goals in promoting fidelity to statutory R
requirements and . . . in increasing the likelihood that the regulatory process will be a reasonable
exercise of discretion instead of a bow in the direction of powerful private groups.”). But see
Wendy E. Wagner, Revisiting the Impact of Judicial Review on Agency Rulemakings: An Empiri-
cal Investigation, 53 WM. & MARY. L. REV. 1717, 1723 (2011–2012) (arguing threat of judicial
review may provide leverage to regulated entities, further reinforcing interest-group capture
concerns).
74 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
1749, 1768–69 (2007) [hereinafter Procedures] (describing positive political theory’s view of
administrative procedure as tool for legislative oversight); Matthew McCubbins, Roger Noll &
Barry Weingast [hereinafter McNollGast], The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure
Act, J.L. ECON & ORG. 180, 185 (1999) (“In practice, Congress and the President possess several
tools to influence ongoing agency operations.”); Meazell, Super Deference, supra note 66, at R
778–79 (suggesting hard-look review of agency science can reinforce these norms); Nina A. Men-
delson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127,
1131–33 (2009–2010) (explaining President’s authority to be involved in rulemaking); Staszewski,
supra note 11, at 1278–84 (describing the value of requiring public officials in a democracy to R
give reasoned explanations for their decisions).
75 See Bressman, Arbitrariness, supra note 15, at 515 (“A model fixated on accountability cannot R
adequately address the concerns for arbitrariness necessary for a truly legitimate administrative
state.”); id. at 528–29 (explaining reason-giving requirement as both promoting accountability and
preventing arbitrariness); Jerry L. Mashaw, Reasoned Administration: The European Union, the
United States, and the Project of Democratic Governance, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 99, 116
(2007–2008) (arguing accountability is only part of reason-giving’s pull because “reason giving is
fundamental to the moral and political legitimacy of the American and European legal orders.”).
76 Bressman, Arbitrariness, supra note 15, at 473–74; Mark Elliott, Has the Common-Law Duty to R
Give Reasons Come of Age Yet?, 1 PUBLIC L. 56, 62 (2011); Staszewski, supra note 11, at 1278. R
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opposed to being naked political preferences held by particular officials.77  In
addition, it imposes discipline by requiring agencies to show how they have
treated similarly situated circumstances similarly, or to explain distinctions
where those arise.78  When an agency provides reasons, impacted individuals
are also able to make informed judgments about whether they perceive the ac-
tion as legitimate.79  Further, reason-giving can promote the sense that individu-
als are treated with respect because — to the extent their views are
acknowledged and responded to — the agency demonstrates that those views
were taken seriously.80  This in turn can enhance broader confidence in the ad-
ministrative state.81
3. Fidelity to Statute
Ultimately, agencies’ procedures and reason-giving are a means to an end:
substantive outcomes.  The substantive legitimacy of those outcomes derives
from compliance with the statutory mandate.82  Although the scope of delegated
authority to most agencies is very broad, their actions must nevertheless be
authorized by a statute83 that in turn delineates the scope of their discretion.84
Once again, the APA reinforces this understanding; in notices of proposed
rules, for example, agencies must make “reference to the legal authority under
which the rule is proposed.”85  And ensuring fidelity to statute is one of the key
functions of judicial review.  While courts provide some measure of deference
to agencies’ policy decisions, they will first ensure that agencies exercise only
such authority as they possess.86
4. Procedure, Substance, and Ex Ante Behavior
Presuming agencies act within the bounds of their delegated authority, it is
notable that courts themselves recognize that legitimacy stems from both proce-
dure and substance.  This point was made quite strikingly in United States v.
77 Staszewski, supra note 11, at 1279–80. R
78 Id. at 1281.  Limits on discretion are especially important for furthering legitimacy when other
mechanisms, like bureaucratic controls, are lacking — such as where agencies have broadly dis-
persed internal authority. See Shapiro & Wright, supra note 12, at 619 (noting that limits on R
discretion can offset lack of bureaucratic control).
79 Elliott, supra note 76, at 61–62. R
80 Id. at 62.
81 Id.; see also Mashaw, supra note 75, at 118 (arguing fundamental acceptability of law lies in its R
ability to provide reasons).
82 See Shapiro & Wright, supra note 12, at 592.
83 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 529 U.S. 120, 125 (2000).
84 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001); see Thomas O. McGarity,
Administrative Law as Blood Sport: Policy Erosion in a Highly Partisan Age, 61 DUKE L.J. 1671,
1723 (2011–2012) (noting that all models of administrative legitimacy “take the legitimacy of
regulatory intervention itself as a given, so long as the intervention is authorized by the agency’s
statute”).
85 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(2).
86 Mass., 549 U.S. at 530–31 (2007); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 258 (2006); Overton
Park, 401 U.S. at 415.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLE\37-2\HLE202.txt unknown Seq: 15 17-JUL-13 9:38
2013] Hammond & Markell, Administrative Proxies for Judicial Review 327
Mead Corporation, in which the Court reasoned that statutory authority justify-
ing Chevron deference might be inferred when Congress contemplates that
agencies will use procedures “tending to foster fairness and deliberation.”87  By
elaborating administrative law, the courts have thus furthered not only the pro-
cedural legitimacy of agency behavior, but its substantive legitimacy.
Additionally, it is worth noting that judicial review encourages legitimiz-
ing behaviors during the decisionmaking process and prior to the possibility for
judicial review.  As Professor Sunstein explains, “the availability of review
will often serve as an important constraint on regulators during the decision-
making process long before review actually comes into play.”88  This view
seems to be the consensus: Professor Bressman, for instance, describes judicial
review as “the principal tool for prompting agencies to undertake reason-giving
and standard-setting.”89  A major concern about nonreviewability doctrines is
thus that they may excuse agencies from engaging in key activities that would
further legitimacy.90
We consider how nonreviewability doctrines operate in the next section,
using the petition-to-withdraw process to provide context.  Before turning to
that context, we complete our development of the ways in which judicial re-
view enhances agency legitimacy by describing how the legitimacy norms pro-
moted by judicial review might be translated into metrics for evaluating inside-
out legitimacy.  In so doing, we are mindful that judicial review is only one
model for legitimizing the administrative state — and an imperfect one at
that.91  But it is both an extraordinarily prominent model and a source of valua-
ble insights into what matters when agencies act.
C. Developing Metrics for Inside-Out Legitimacy
As should be clear from the preceding discussion, judicial review brings
legitimacy to agencies’ procedures and substantive reasoning while ensuring
fidelity to statute.  The question we pose is whether insights about the legiti-
mizing quality of judicial review can inform assessment of the legitimacy of
87 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001); see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (setting forth two-step analysis for
agency interpretations of their statutory mandates); Bressman, Procedures, supra note 74, at
1791–93 (explaining Mead as promoting legislative oversight where more formal procedures are
used, and providing enhanced role for courts where political supervision is more difficult because
of less formal procedures).
88 Sunstein, supra note 72, at 656. R
89 Bressman, Inaction, supra note 35, at 1691; see Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in R
the Review of Administrative Policymaking, 118 YALE L.J. 64, 98 (2008); see also Mark
Seidenfeld, Playing Games With the Timing of Judicial Review: An Evaluation of Proposals to
Restrict Pre-Enforcement Review of Agency Rules, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 85, 116 (1997–1998).
90 Bressman, Inaction, supra note 35, at 1691. R
91 The critiques are too numerous to fully detail. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and
the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 528
(1997–1998) (arguing hard-look scrutiny has caused the rulemaking process to ossify signifi-
cantly); Meazell, Super Deference, supra note 66, at 778–84 (arguing against overly deferential R
judicial review of legislative science); Shapiro, Fisher, & Wagner, supra note 60, at 15 (elaborat- R
ing numerous flaws).
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agency procedures, even in situations when such review is unlikely.  If an
agency supports its actions with steps courts consider important when review-
ing agency performance, should that at least arguably provide some support for
viewing the agency action to have some measure of legitimacy?  Put another
way, can the “substantive priors” a court brings to its role as an agency re-
viewer be transferable to the different soil of inside-out legitimacy?  Our hy-
pothesis is that the answer to these questions is yes.
With this hypothesis in mind, in this section we propose metrics for as-
sessing intrinsic legitimacy that draw from the mechanisms by which judicial
review enhances legitimacy.  Although those mechanisms are varied, they in-
clude three key considerations: (1) how procedures are implemented; (2) how
the agency treats the process; and (3) the substantive outcomes reached.
1. Metric 1: How the Procedure Is Used
Especially for citizen-initiated procedures,92 metrics concerning how a
procedure is used capture important information about the perceived legitimacy
of a process as well as the substantive issues that will frame the agency’s re-
sponse.   Thus, while measuring a procedure’s use does not perfectly mirror
standards of judicial review, it provides important information about legitimacy
in its own right and is a necessary predicate to applying additional legitimacy
metrics.
With respect to perceived legitimacy, sustained citizen triggering of a pro-
cess over time suggests “a sign of vitality”93 for the process, as well as an
inference that citizens perceive it as an outlet for voice and as legitimate in
other respects.  By contrast, decreasing usage over time suggests a process of
little perceived value, in which the costs outweigh potential benefits.94  In this
way, measuring the extent to which a procedure is used permits a backstop
assessment of legitimacy: Even if our other metrics revealed indicia of legiti-
macy, one would need to question whether a procedure that was never or only
rarely used could truly be called legitimate.
In addition to the extent to which a procedure is used, how it is used pro-
vides a commonsense foundation from which to understand and apply our other
legitimacy metrics.  By “how” a procedure is used, we include the substantive
concerns raised but also take note of the relative sophistication with which they
are raised.  When a citizen triggers an agency procedure, the concerns the citi-
zen raises, and the sophistication with which he or she does so, will frame the
dialogue that is to come.  Just as agencies must respond to significant points
92 There is a range of citizen-initiated procedures in addition to petitions to withdraw, such as
petitions for rulemaking and citizen suits. See infra text accompanying notes 118–121 (discussing R
other such procedures).  Agency-initiated procedures might also be assessed according to features
of their use.  For an excellent discussion of the significance of agencies’ choice of policymaking
form, see Magill, supra note 3. R
93 John H. Knox & David L. Markell, Evaluating Citizen Procedures: Lessons from the Analysis
of the NAFTA Environmental Commission, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J. 505, 515 (2012).
94 Of course, this default presumption of the meaning of use could be overcome by other more
specific indications (or not) of legitimacy. Id. at 515 n.52.
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raised during a rulemaking — which furthers legitimacy as described above —
we would expect them to address concerns raised in other proceedings.95  Un-
derstanding how a procedure is used is thus a necessary predicate to under-
standing the legitimacy of how the agency responds.
2. Metric 2: Treatment — Responsiveness and Reason-Giving
The way an agency treats the process that has been triggered provides
critical information about whether the agency is engaging in legitimizing be-
haviors.  We use the term “treatment” to include an agency’s responsiveness as
well as its reason-giving, recognizing that these categories have substantial
overlap.  Responsiveness refers to the extent to which the agency acknowledges
and seeks resolutions of the concerns that were raised.  This component of
treatment is analogous to the judicially created requirement that agencies re-
spond to significant points raised in the rulemaking context.  As described
above, when agencies treat processes as opportunities for participation and re-
spond to concerns raised, they build legitimacy by reinforcing participation,
deliberation, voice, and trust.
As is also evident from the discussion above, the reason-giving require-
ment plays a significant role in furthering legitimacy because much of its force
comes from its impact on agency behavior ex ante.  Agencies expecting judicial
review will provide rationales for their decisions that reveal deliberations, fur-
ther transparency, illustrate neutrality, evidence respect for the parties, and
demonstrate compliance with statutory mandates. If an agency provides a rea-
soned explanation for its decisions even when judicial review is not expected,
there is reason to think it is building legitimacy by doing so.
3. Metric 3: Substantive Outcomes
The ultimate substantive outcome of a process provides a final metric for
its legitimacy. First, outcomes help assess a program’s fidelity to statute.  If
measurable changes are made in statutorily mandated areas of concern, we can
infer that using the process helped legitimize agency behavior in a substantive
way.  Second, outcomes reveal important information about the internal legiti-
macy of a process as a practical matter.  While a pure proceduralist might be
satisfied with procedures that seem to further administrative law values and
procedural justice norms, most scholars acknowledge that the distributive con-
sequences of a process also are important to assessments of the legitimacy of
that process.96  Thus, much like our metric for extent of use, substantive out-
comes provide a backstop check on legitimacy.  Certainly, we would not expect
95 See Mantel, supra note 13, at 398 (discussing participation-reinforcing value of requiring agen- R
cies to respond to meaningful comments raised).
96 See Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discretionary Le-
gal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 703, 790–91
(1993–1994) (noting potential concerns associated with relying on procedural justness to divert
attention from substantive outcomes).
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outcomes to always favor one side or another, but if change seems unobtain-
able, a process may be viewed as arbitrary or useless, undermining its overall
legitimacy.97
In summary, our metrics attempt to capture the key points of emphasis
underlying judicial review of agency action.  Understanding how judicial re-
view furthers agency legitimacy suggests generally applicable principles that
can be translated into metrics for inside-out legitimacy.  These metrics can thus
serve as proxies for judicial review when that particular legitimizing check is
lacking.98  In the next section, we begin the process of applying and testing our
metrics.
II. CASE STUDY: THE EPA PETITION-TO-WITHDRAW PROCESS
With the theoretical foundations of administrative legitimacy in place, we
now shift to the theory’s application with a case study of the process whereby
interested persons can petition EPA to withdraw state authority.  This section
starts by situating the petition-to-withdraw process in its cooperative federalism
context.  We then provide an overview of how we compiled our dataset of in-
formation relating to the petitions that have been filed.  Next, we describe how
the petition process works using observations from our study, contextualized
according to: (1) the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions; and (2)
how the process avoids judicial review. This background reveals why the peti-
tion-to-withdraw process is an ideal context from which to explore inside-out
legitimacy and sets the stage for our analysis in the following section.
A. Environmental Regulation Under Cooperative Federalism
Congress’s vision for administering the major federal environmental stat-
utes is fairly straightforward when viewed from a big-picture perspective.  Con-
gress articulated goals for protecting and preserving the nation’s resources,
established strategies for achieving these goals, and directed EPA to elaborate
and implement these strategies.  Congress also directed EPA to authorize states
to take over implementation, under laws the states would enact, with EPA per-
forming an oversight responsibility.99  The latter facet of this congressional
scheme is known as a cooperative federalism approach to regulation.100
Under this approach, EPA has two main functions: (1) the ex ante respon-
sibility of allowing only qualified states to take over a regulatory program in
97 We note a limitation of this metric as compared with judicial review.  While courts provide a
legitimizing check on an agency’s exercise of power by assessing what the agency did and why,
our substantive outcomes metric is unable to capture that level of detail.  In other words, we do
not attempt to assess the quality of the outcomes achieved but rather the presence of outcomes.
See infra text accompanying notes 210–226 (providing additional analysis). R
98 Of course, these metrics cannot fully capture external review from an outside institution. See
supra Part I.B. (describing functions of judicial review).
99 For a full description, see RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 23, at 15–16. R
100 Id.
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lieu of EPA; and after state approval, (2) the ex post responsibility of monitor-
ing state performance.101  The cooperative federalism structure is quite mature
at this point; the Environmental Council of the States (“ECOS”) reports that
EPA has approved state authorization for approximately 96 percent of the eligi-
ble regulatory programs.102
Once EPA has exercised its gatekeeper function of authorizing a state to
administer a regulatory program, it retains an array of tools to enable it to per-
form its oversight duties.  These include the authority to obtain information
from states about program implementation;103 the power to review, reject, and
ultimately override draft state permits;104 and the ability to conduct inspections
in authorized states and to pursue its own enforcement actions if the state has
not acted or EPA views the state’s actions as insufficient.105
Beyond these types of ex post oversight, EPA retains authority to withdraw
a state’s authorization under certain circumstances.106  These include: a state’s
legal authority is no longer adequate;107 its operation of the regulatory program
fails to conform to requirements (e.g., permitting is deficient because of inade-
quate opportunities for public participation);108 or enforcement does not pass
muster (e.g., failure to enforce in circumstances where enforcement is appropri-
ate, failure to seek appropriate relief, or failure to meet inspection
expectations).109
Withdrawal of authority is not a step EPA is to take lightly, and it cannot
do so without providing numerous procedural protections for the targeted
state.110  Indeed, withdrawing a state’s authorization is the “nuclear weapon” in
the toolbox EPA has available to it to promote appropriate state administration
of its regulatory program.111  The reality is that EPA has rarely initiated a with-
101 EPA continues to operate the federal regulatory programs in states that have not been approved
to do so.
102 Envtl. Council of the States, Resolution 00-1, On Environmental Federalism, at 1 (revised
March 20, 2012) (on file with authors).
103 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 123.41(a) (allowing EPA access to any information relevant to CWA
permit program “upon request without restriction”); id. §§ 123.41(a) (specifying that a state must
share with EPA information submitted to the state under a claim of confidentiality).
104 See id. § 123.44 (providing for EPA review of and objections to state NPDES permits).
105 The extent to which the courts have acceded to EPA enforcement in authorized states, particu-
larly under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, remains in question to some degree.
Compare, e.g., Harmon Indus. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding EPA lacked
authority under RCRA when it overfiled state agency’s enforcement efforts), with United States v.
Power Eng’g, 125 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (D. Colo. 2000) (holding EPA had authority to seek financial
assurances despite independent state enforcement proceedings).
106 E.g., 40 C.F.R. § 123.64 (setting forth procedures for withdrawal of CWA authorization).
107 E.g., id. § 123.62 (setting forth procedures for revision of state CWA programs). A state is
responsible for informing EPA of proposed changes to its basic statutory or regulatory authority
and for demonstrating to EPA that the state qualifies for continued authorization when its authori-
ties change. Id.
108 Id. § 123.63.
109 E.g., id. (setting forth criteria for withdrawal of CWA programs).
110 See infra text accompanying note 174 (describing withdrawal procedures). R
111 See Brigham Daniels, When Agencies Go Nuclear: A Game Theoretical Approach to the Big-
gest Sticks in an Agency’s Arsenal, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 442, 450 (2012) (“A regulatory nuke
is a tool with two primary characteristics. First, it packs power sufficient to profoundly impact
individual regulatory targets or significantly affect important aspects of society or the economy.
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drawal proceeding on its own.112  Some commentators have suggested that this
may be because of its signaling effect; the confrontational note it sounds in the
state/federal relationship may not be well received by an audience of protective
congresspeople and others.113 Professor Robert Percival invokes related federal-
ism concerns when he characterizes the mechanism as a “crude tool” and sug-
gests that its crudeness has “added even more aggravation to the federal-state
maelstrom.”114
In addition, it seems indisputable that the significant resources required to
administer a program have deterred EPA from displacing states and reinstating
federal programs.115  As Professor Ronald Krotoszynski opines, the withdrawal
of a state’s primary status is simply not credible.116  He explains that EPA lacks
the resources to take over state programs, stating that EPA “reacted with abject
horror” to a state proposal to return a portion of a major federal environmental
program and “negotiated a last-minute deal with the [state] to abort the return
process.”117
Congress did not rely entirely on EPA and the states for implementing the
environmental laws.  Instead, it reserved a variety of roles for interested citi-
zens, including the ability to bring suit against individual parties that are alleg-
edly operating in violation of the law and also to sue EPA for failure to perform
non-discretionary acts.118  Concerning the latter, the CWA, for example, pro-
vides that “any citizen” may “commence a civil action” against EPA “where
there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty . . .
Second, from the perspective of the regulatory agency, it is politically unavailable in all but the
most extreme situations.”).
112 Cf. Final Rule, Partial Withdrawal of Approval of 34 Clean Air Act Part 70 Operating Permits
Programs in California, 67 Fed. Reg. 63551 (Oct. 15, 2002) (partially withdrawing California’s
Title V authority).   EPA occasionally threatens withdrawal outside of the petition context. See
RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 23, at 330–31 (describing threats); Markus G. Puder and R
Michel J. Paque, Tremors in the Cooperative Environmental Federalism Arena: What Happens
When a State Wants to Assume Only Portions of a Primacy Program or Return a Primacy Pro-
gram? – The Underground Injection Control Program Under the Safe Drinking Water Act as a
Case Study, 24 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 71, 87–88 (2005) (describing EPA’s threat to
withdraw Illinois UIC program).
113 Daniels, supra note 111, at 463 (describing such tools as “political taboo” because using them R
would go against Congress’s default scheme, which may have oversight ramifications).
114 Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models,
54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1144–45 (1995); see also WILLIAM H. RODGERS JR., 4 ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW: HAZARDOUS WASTES AND SUBSTANCES § 7.22, at 643 (1992) (calling withdrawal  “a rem-
edy strictly confined to unusual legal pathologies”).
115 OIG Report, supra note 27, at 17.  The OIG notes that EPA has power to take a number of steps R
short of de-authorization to help states improve their programs. Id.; see also RECHTSCHAFFEN &
MARKELL, supra note 23, at 106–07 (discussing alternatives to termination of state primacy R
status).
116 Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Cooperative Federalism, the New Formalism, and the Separation
of Powers Revisited: Free Enterprise Fund and the Problem of Presidential Oversight of State
Government Officers Enforcing Federal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 1599, 1637 (2012).
117 Id. at 1638; see also RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 23, at 331–32 (identifying re- R
sources and politics as primary reasons for EPA reluctance to withdraw programs).  The environ-
ment itself could also suffer were EPA to engage in widespread withdrawal because of EPA’s
resource limitations. See id. at 331.
118 For symposium treatment of citizen suits, see Environmental Citizen Suits at Thirtysomething:
A Celebration and Summit, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 1 (2003).
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which is not discretionary with the Administrator.”119  In addition, citizens may
sue under the APA in certain circumstances.120  Although these statutes author-
ize suits generally, they also include numerous hurdles to review, some of
which are applicable in the petitions context and discussed further below.
It is worth emphasizing that over the past twenty-five years, citizen peti-
tions to withdraw have for the most part been handled within the administrative
state rather than in the courts.  Thus, the ability of interested persons to petition
EPA to withdraw state authorization has played out far differently from the
direct access to the courts that citizen suits afford citizens.  Perhaps because of
this, and despite its potential practical value and theoretical importance as an
example of an administrative accountability mechanism, the petition-to-with-
draw process has received little scholarly attention.121  The next section begins
to fill that gap by detailing the scope of our study and data collection efforts.
B. The Scope of the Study and Data Collection Efforts
To better understand the petition process, we sought to collect all of the
petitions filed through December 31, 2011.  We confined our analysis to peti-
tions made to EPA seeking withdrawal of state authority; thus, we excluded
challenges to EPA’s initial grant of authorization122 as well as efforts to use the
courts as a forum of first resort to seek withdrawal — i.e., lawsuits filed in
court without first filing an administrative petition to withdraw with EPA.123
Using the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”)124 we asked EPA for all peti-
tions that had been filed, information about each petition, and petition-related
materials.125  We also used traditional legal search engines and web browser
searches to identify petitions and any activity on them, particularly activity in
119 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2); see also CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) (“[A]ny person may com-
mence a civil action . . . where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or
duty . . . which is not discretionary with the Administrator.”); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(2)
(same as CAA).
120 See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (providing grounds for review).
121 The sparse scholarly discussion focuses on withdrawal generally, rather than the petition pro-
cess. Cf. RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 23, at 329–35 (describing withdrawal tool); R
Krotoszynski, supra note 116, at 1637–38 (similar). R
122 E.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Homebuilders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644 (2007) (upholding
EPA’s decision to authorize Arizona to administer NPDES program without considering endan-
gered species impacts); Akiak Native Cmty. v. EPA, 625 F.3d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 2010) (uphold-
ing EPA’s decision to authorize Alaska to administer NPDES program).
123 E.g., Save the Valley v. EPA, 223 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1014–15 (S.D. Ind. 2002) (on cross-motions
for summary judgment, declining to order EPA to withdraw Indiana’s NPDES authorization but
ordering state to bring its program into compliance); Weatherby Lake Improvement Co. v.
Browner, No. 96-1155-CV-W-8, 1997 WL 687656 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 17, 1997) (granting EPA
motion to dismiss claim against agency for failing to withdraw Missouri’s NPDES authorization).
We also excluded various other participation mechanisms, including citizen suits, petitions for
rulemaking, and individual permit appeals.
124 5 U.S.C. §552 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
125 See Letter from David L. Markell, Steven M. Goldstein Prof. of Law, Fla. State Univ., to Carol
Ann Siciliano, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, EPA (Nov. 9, 2011) (on file with authors) (requesting infor-
mation about petitions).  Related materials included such items as correspondence and reports
related to the concerns raised by petitions.
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the courts.  In an effort to supplement the information we obtained from EPA
and our own research, we emailed at least one petitioner for each petition ask-
ing for a status update on the petition and other information.126  Finally, to
check our dataset, we asked EPA officials to review, and as necessary update
and correct, the data contained in a spreadsheet we compiled that listed each
petition and, for each petition, included the names of the petitioners and the
state, EPA region, and regulatory program(s) involved.127  We continued to re-
quest information from EPA about particular petitions as questions arose during
the coding process, and we updated our dataset through June 2012.
There are 58 petitions to withdraw in our dataset; basic details about each
are set forth in the Appendix.128  We made several judgment calls in creating the
dataset.  For example, in some instances different petitioners filed separate peti-
tions asking EPA to withdraw a particular program or programs in the same
state.  When EPA consolidated treatment of those petitions, we did so as well.129
The documents we obtained from EPA, through our own research, and from the
petitioners provided the raw data from which we coded our variables.130
To better understand the way the petition process is actually implemented,
we reviewed our files initially to determine: (1) what EPA did after receiving a
petition; (2) the dispositions of the petitions; (3) at what procedural stages those
dispositions occurred; (4) the extent to which judicial review was sought; and
(5) the outcomes of any such judicial challenges.  To contextualize this infor-
mation, below we provide the regulatory and statutory framework for the peti-
tions, including the interpretations courts have given to that framework.
Overall, our observations confirm that much of the activity on petitions takes
place at a procedural stage in which EPA has great discretion, which means it
lacks both mandatory duties and the check that judicial review would provide.
126 Because of the age of some of the petitions, we were not able to obtain contact information for
a handful of the petitioners.
127 See E-mail from David L. Markell, Steven M. Goldstein Prof. of Law, Fla. State Univ., to
Carol Ann Siciliano, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, EPA (Nov. 9, 2011, 17:31 EST) (on file with authors)
(transmitting spreadsheet).  As noted above, we were very impressed by the professionalism and
assistance of EPA personnel.
128 The petitions and related materials are Bates-stamped as PETN #####.  As needed, we cite to
the Bates number and/or the File Number listed in the Appendix when discussing particular
petitions.
129 For example, EPA treated 3 Alabama petitions as a single petition, and one of those petitions
included 5 amendments. See Letter from James D. Giattina, Dir., EPA, to Lance R. LeFleur, Dir.,
Ala. Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt. (Apr. 15, 2011) (PETN 011508; File No. 33) (on file with author).  We
similarly followed EPA’s lead when EPA treated a petition that involved two or more statutes as
separate requests to withdraw. E.g., Letter from Carl E. Edlund, P.E., Dir. Multimedia Planning
and Permitting Div. (6PD), to Dorothy Jenkins, President, Concerned Citizens of New Sarpy, and
Anne Rolfes, Dir., La. Bucket Brigade (Jun. 11, 2002) (PETN 000594; Files No. 2a, 2b) (on file
with author).
130 We were unable to obtain the petitions associated with 8 files.  However, we verified with EPA,
and petitioners if possible, that petitions were indeed filed, which we corroborated using other
documents provided by EPA.  Coding was conducted by the authors and three research assistants.
A pilot study of inter-coder reliability sampled 9 of the 58 petition files (15.5%) and revealed an
inter-coder reliability of 0.87 across 61 variables, suggesting no significant reliability problems.
Coding disagreements were resolved through mutual consultation and cross-checking. Additional
methodological details are on file with the authors.
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C. The Petition-to-Withdraw Process and Hurdles to Review
There are two phases of a petition process: an initial period of informal
investigation; and, should EPA find cause to move forward, the formal proce-
dures by which a withdrawal would be effectuated.  Most of the petition activ-
ity took place during the informal phase, when judicial review is difficult, if not
impossible, to obtain.
1. Right to Petition and Informal Phase of Petitions’ Consideration
Interested parties may petition EPA for withdrawal of state authorization
under either the applicable program’s regulations or the APA.131  Once a petition
is filed, there are no mandatory requirements except that EPA must respond in
writing to any petition to commence withdrawal proceedings.132  Beyond this
responsibility, a great deal of discretion is left to EPA.  Under the CWA, for
example, the regulations provide that EPA may conduct an informal investiga-
tion of the allegations in the petition to determine whether cause exists to com-
mence withdrawal proceedings.133  Similarly, EPA may order commencement of
withdrawal proceedings in response to a petition alleging a state’s failure to
administer the program properly.134  The regulations, in short, do not obligate
EPA to investigate claims to determine whether they have merit, or to initiate a
formal withdrawal proceeding; nor do they establish time frames for EPA to
proceed in any particular way.135
131 The regulations promulgated under the CWA and RCRA expressly contemplate such petitions
by interested parties. See 40 C.F.R. § 123.64(b)(1) (CWA) (“The Administrator may order the
commencement of withdrawal proceedings . . . in response to a petition from an interested per-
son”); Procedures for Withdrawing Approval of State Programs, 40 C.F.R. § 271.23(b)(1) (2013)
(similar).  While the CAA and SDWA regulations lack similar provisions, there is little doubt that
the APA provides the necessary mechanism for petitioning. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2013) (provid-
ing that an interested person may petition for “the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule”).
Because withdrawal of state authority is considered a rulemaking, a petition under one of these
statutes would be considered a petition for issuance or repeal of a rule. See, e.g., Partial With-
drawal of Approval of 34 Clean Air Act Part 70 Operating Permits Programs in Cal., 67 Fed. Reg.
63551 (Oct. 15, 2002) (partially withdrawing California’s Title V authority); 42 U.S.C. § 300h-
1(b)(2) (2013) (approval of state program is accomplished by rule).  The source of a petitioner’s
ability to petition for withdrawal is immaterial for purposes of this Article, though we note the
constitutional foundations. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (petitions clause).
132 40 C.F.R. § 123.64(b)(1) (CWA); Procedures for Withdrawing Approval of State Programs, 40
C.F.R. § 271.23(b)(1) (2013); see also 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (2013) (“Prompt notice shall be given of
the denial in whole or in part of a written application, petition, or other request of an interested
person made in connection with any agency proceeding. . . .  [T]he notice shall be accompanied
by a brief statement of the grounds for denial.”).
133 40 C.F.R. § 123.64(b)(1).
134 Id.
135 This is also true of the other regulatory programs.   Procedures for Withdrawing Approval of
State Programs, 40 C.F.R. § 271.23(b)(1) (2013) (similar); Procedures for Withdrawal of State
Programs, 40 C.F.R. § 145.34(b) (2013) (similar); see Pub. Citizen v. EPA, 343 F.3d 449, 464 (5th
Cir. 2003) (under CAA, EPA has discretion whether to initiate formal withdrawal, even when it is
made aware of deficiencies).  A May 2000 memorandum issued by the Director of EPA’s Water
Permits Division established procedures for regions to use in responding to CWA petitions, such
as acknowledging receipt of the petition in writing.  Memorandum from Charles H. Sutfin to
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Nearly all the petition activity that we observed took place as part of an
informal EPA investigation, which EPA commenced in response to the vast
majority of petitions.136  During that informal period, EPA often requested a
response from the state agency, interacted with petitioners and the state, and
independently researched the concerns raised in the petition.137  Usually, EPA
and the state arrived at negotiated outcomes and petitions were denied or other-
wise considered resolved.138
To give a concrete example, in 2008, Illinois Citizens for Clean Air &
Water filed a petition with EPA Region 5 seeking withdrawal of the State’s
NPDES program for failure to regulate discharges from Concentrated Animal
Feeding Operations (“CAFOs”).139  The petitions raised concerns about inade-
quate citizen participation, permitting, inspections, and enforcement associated
with the state’s program.140  EPA developed a protocol for responding to the
petition141 and thereafter, it: conducted interviews with Illinois EPA staff and
Illinois Attorney General staff; reviewed Illinois CAFO permit applications,
compliance inspection reports, complaint investigations, and enforcement ac-
tions; reviewed various documents related to the EPA/Illinois partnership; and
Water Permits Program Managers Regions I-X, NPDES State Program Withdrawal Petitions –
Response Procedures and Status Update (May 4, 2000) [hereinafter Withdrawal Guidance].  The
memorandum embodies the stance EPA has taken: Regions should “[m]ake every effort to assist
the State and Petitioner(s) to resolve their concerns jointly without necessitating . . . commence-
ment of formal withdrawal proceedings.” Id.  We did not uncover any further guidance docu-
ments relating to how regions were to handle petitions to withdraw.
136 We observed informal investigations in response to nearly 95% of the petitions — all but 3.
We were unable to code an informal investigation for 2 petitions (Files No. 53 and 74) because our
materials contained no information beyond the petitions themselves.  A third petition was filed in
December 2011 and there was no follow-up to report as of May 2012. See Letter from Sparsh
Khandeshi, Envtl. Integrity Project, and Anne Rolfes, La. Bucket Brigade, to Lisa Jackson, EPA
Adm’r, and Al Armendariz, EPA Regional Adm’r (Dec. 14, 2011) (PETN 013846; File No. 70) (on
file with authors); see also Activists Criticize Louisiana Air Program, INSIDEEPA.COM, May 29,
2012, http://insideepa.com/201205292400152/EPA-Blog/The-Inside-Story (stating EPA had yet to
respond to December 2011 petition).
137 EPA sent an acknowledgment letter to petitioners just over 60% of the time.  Inquiry letters
from EPA to the relevant state agency were documented about 53% of the time.  Furthermore,
EPA sent at least one status or follow-up letter to the petitioner nearly 57% of the time.  In about
38% of the files, there were indications that informal meetings between EPA and petitioners had
taken place.  These variables were coded based only on what was apparent from the documents
that we obtained from our research outlined above.  These data almost certainly understate what
EPA did after receiving petitions, particularly to the extent communication took place orally or via
e-mail as opposed to hard copy.
138 EPA used the word “denied” with about 55% of the petitions.  In other circumstances, it called
petitions “resolved” or did not label them with a disposition at all. See, e.g., Letter from Wayne
Nastri, Reg’l Adm’r, EPA, to Roger Flynn, Western Mining Action Project (Dec. 9, 2008) (PETN
003897; File No. 13) (on file with authors) (“As a result of Nevada’s corrective action, EPA
considers the issue resolved.”).  We coded petitions as “denied” only when EPA so described its
disposition.
139 Petition from Kendall M. Thu, Ph.D., Representative, and Danielle J. Diamond, J.D., Represen-
tative, Illinois Citizens for Clean Air & Water, to Stephen Johnson, Adm’r, and Mary A. Gade,
Reg’l Adm’r, EPA (Mar. 27, 2008) (PETN 011043; File No. 41) (on file with authors).
140 See id. at 5 (permitting and inspections), 9 (participation), 10 (enforcement).
141 Memorandum from Peter G. Swenson, Chief, NPDES Programs Branch, and Sally Swanson,
Chief, Water Enforcement and Compliance Branch, to Timothy C. Henry, Acting Dir., Water Div.,
(undated) (PETN 011059; File No. 41) (on file with authors).
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conducted meetings with the petitioners.142  Following its investigation, EPA
determined that the State failed to comply with the CWA and it identified re-
quired and recommended actions that Illinois needed to take.143  Ultimately,
EPA and Illinois entered into a new Memorandum of Agreement and developed
a workplan for addressing the concerns raised.144
As we describe more fully below, numerous petitions similarly resulted in
substantive changes following informal investigations.145  But one concern
stood out in the informal investigation stage: some petitions languished in this
stage for years.146  We found that the time it took EPA to finalize its response to
petitions ranged from one year to 14 years,147 with an average time of 4.4
years.148  Durations of this length are akin to those in major rulemakings,149 and,
as might be expected, a number of petitioners expressed frustration with EPA
because of delays.150
142 See Initial Results of an Informal Investigation of the Nat’l Pollutant Discharge Elimination
Sys. Program for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations in the State of Ill. 7 (Region 5, EPA
Working Paper, Sept. 2010) (PETN 011000; File No. 41) (on file with authors) (detailing
methodology).
143 Letter from Susan Hedman, Reg’l Adm’r, EPA, to Douglas Scott, Dir., Ill. EPA (Sept. 28, 2010)
(PETN 010998; File No. 41) (on file with author).
144 See Ill. Program Work Plan Agreement between Ill. EPA and Region 5, EPA (Feb. 24, 2011)
(PETN 011068; File No. 41) (on file with author).  Note that our files do not reflect any final
communication from EPA to the petitioners stating that the petition was denied, resolved, or other-
wise concluded.
145 See infra Part III.C.
146 While timeliness is not strictly a component of procedural justice, we believe it has important
consequences for the perceived legitimacy of a process. See Tom R. Tyler, Public Trust and
Confidence in Legal Authorities: What Do Majority and Minority Group Members Want from the
Law and Legal Institutions?, 19 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 215, 216, 233 (2001); Tyler & Markell, supra
note 19, at 548 (noting issues such as cost and delay are not justice issues, but do feature in R
discussions of public discontent); see also Knox & Markell, supra note 93, at 516 (“It seems R
obvious that a procedure that does not reach timely results is likely to be considered less effective
and attractive than one that does, all else remaining equal.”).
147 Files No. 50 and 55 each took 14 years to resolve.
148 Median = 3; standard deviation = 3.74.  We were able to calculate durations for 40 of the
petitions by subtracting the variable “year1” from “year2.” The variable “year1” reflects the year
the petition was initially filed. Ideally, the variable “year2” reflects the year in which EPA issued
a final determination on a petition.  But because our files did not always include a final determina-
tion, we also coded the year in which some other resolution of the petition was reached as
“year2.”  For example, sometimes a state legislature would enact an amendment addressing con-
cerns about legal authority but the petition file did not include any final follow-up communication
from EPA to the petitioner.  In such circumstances, we coded “year2” to reflect the year the
statutory amendment went into effect.  Because some petitions are still pending and others’ out-
comes are unknown, we were not always able to obtain a value for “year2.”  Further methodolog-
ical details are on file with the authors.
149 For empirical studies providing rulemaking details, see generally Government Accountability
Office (“GAO”), Federal Rulemaking: Improvements Needed to Monitoring and Evaluation of
Rules Development as Well as to the Transparency of OMB Regulatory Reviews 18 (GAO-09-205
Apr. 2009)).  For empirical studies providing rulemaking details, see generally id.; Jacob E. Ger-
sen & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 923
(2007–2008); Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agency Rulemaking and Political Transitions, 105 NW. L.
REV. 471 (2011).
150 See Letter from Eric Schaeffer, Exec. Dir., Envtl. Integrity Project, to the Honorable Peter
Silva, Office of Water Assistant Administrator, EPA (Oct. 7, 2010) [hereinafter EIP Letter] (urg-
ing timely responses to petitions) (PETN 011288) (on file with authors). EPA itself seems aware
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Although the APA contemplates potential recourse to the courts to “com-
pel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed,”151 it is very
difficult to prevail on such a claim, particularly in “non-deadline” suits.152  The
typical approach is to balance a number of factors that are sensitive to separa-
tion-of-powers and institutional competence concerns:153 there is a judicial re-
luctance to interfere with how an agency prioritizes its work; the absence of a
legal standard to apply makes review difficult; and there is lack of an agency
decision to help focus the court’s review.154  Even if a court were sympathetic to
a claim of delay, it would likely do no more than impose a timeframe on the
agency to provide a response.155  Our files revealed little traction in the courts
on this basis.156
In addition to courts’ reluctance to interfere with EPA on “delay” grounds
in the absence of statutory deadlines for action, courts have also proved averse
to suits attempting to require EPA to initiate withdrawal proceedings because
doing so is a “wholly discretionary exercise of EPA’s authority.”157  Here po-
tential plaintiffs have two difficulties.  First, the applicable mandates in the or-
of the potential for difficulties in this area.  As the Withdrawal Guidance notes, it is “important to
maintain communications with petitioners regarding the status of a complex petition . . . so that a
petitioner does not erroneously conclude that EPA has unreasonably delayed action on its peti-
tion.” Withdrawal Guidance, supra note 135. R
151 5 U.S.C. § 706(1); Sierra Club v. EPA, 377 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1208 (N.D. Fla. 2005) (“Any
undue delay by the EPA in making a decision also is reviewable in the court of appeals.”).
152 For a discussion contrasting courts’ responses to petition and deadline suits under § 706(1), see
Meazell, Dialogue, supra note 18, at 1730–31. For a positive assessment of the usefulness of R
deadline suits for citizen enforcement of environmental laws, see Wendy E. Wagner, Katherine
Barnes & Lisa Peters, Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission
Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 137 (2011) (documenting empirical study showing domination
of industry group contacts in air toxics rule development).
153 See Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC (TRAC), 750 F.2d 70, 79–80 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(setting forth multi-factor rule of reason).
154 As Professor Levin has noted, these same concerns animate the Heckler doctrine, which is
elaborated infra note 162.  Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative R
Law, 74 MINN. L. REV. 689, 771 (1990).
155 See TRAC, 750 F.2d at 81 (declining to issue mandamus but retaining jurisdiction while agency
developed schedule).
156 There were two district court challenges raising unreasonable delay claims associated with
petition inactivity.  However, courts of appeal, not district courts, have jurisdiction over such
claims in the CWA context and in neither case was the claim actually considered. See Johnson
Cnty. Citizen Comm. for Clean Air & Water v. EPA, No. 3:05-0222, 2005 WL 2204953, at *6
(M.D. Tenn. 2005) (Sept. 9, 2005) (File No. 23) (granting EPA’s motion to dismiss APA unreason-
able delay claim because district court did not have jurisdiction over such claims); Sierra Club,
377 F. Supp. 2d  at 1206–07 & n.1 (File No. 25) (describing jurisdictional concerns and plaintiffs’
voluntary dismissal of unreasonable delay claim).  In another example, petitioners filed a com-
plaint, again in district court, alleging unreasonable delay on a petition raising CWA and CAA
issues; the suit was settled and EPA proceeded to its informal investigation.  Compl. at para. 14,
NW Envt’l Def. Ctr v. Clarke, No. C97-1005 (W.D. Wash. filed June 17, 1997) (File No. 19a,
19b).  We observed no other unreasonable delay claims related to petitions filed in federal courts.
One explanation may be that petitioners were able to prompt EPA to respond simply by threaten-
ing litigation. See, e.g., Compl. for Decl. and Inj. Relief, Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. Clarke, No.
C97-1005 (W.D.Wash. June 17, 1997) (PETN 004825; Files No. 19a, 19b) (on file with author).
157 Johnson Cnty. Citizen Comm. for Clean Air & Water v. EPA, NO. 305-0222, 2005 WL
2204953, at *4 (D. Tenn. Sept. 9, 2005).
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ganic statutes authorize citizen suits only to enforce non-discretionary duties.158
Courts have read withdrawal provisions to mean that the decision whether to
commence withdrawal proceedings is discretionary, not mandatory.159  Second,
the APA exempts from review actions “committed to agency discretion by
law.”160  As one court emphasized, “[t]he Administrator is under no
mandatory duty to investigate complaints, hold hearings, or make findings of
violations . . . .”161   As a result, potential claimants can rely on neither the
relevant environmental statute nor the APA for their cause of action.162  A con-
clusion to the contrary, courts reason, would “eviscerate EPA’s discretionary
authority” and interfere with the agency’s ability to efficiently allocate its re-
sources to develop a “rational enforcement approach.”163
158 See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C.A § 1365(a)(2) (authorizing citizen suits where there is failure to
perform “any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator”);
CAA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7604(a)(2); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972A(a)(2).
159 See Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill Inc. v. EPA, 377 Fed. Appx. 406, 408 (5th Cir. 2010) (File No.
7) (holding EPA’s decision not to initiate withdrawal of Texas RCRA program was exercise of
unreviewable enforcement discretion); Del. Cnty. Safe Drinking Water Coal. v. McGinty, No. 07-
1782, 2007 WL 4225580, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 27, 2007) (“EPA has no non-discretionary duty to
withdraw approval of state NPDES programs.”); Sierra Club, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 1208 (File No.
25) (“A citizen’s suit to enforce such discretionary duties is not available.”); Johnson Cnty., 2005
WL 2204953, at *4 (“[T]he plain language [of the CWA] does not compel the EPA Administra-
tor to make such a determination by any particular time, or at all”).  In a related context, outside
the ambit of our study because no petition was filed with EPA prior to initiating a lawsuit, a court
proceeded to the merits of a suit seeking withdrawal of Indiana’s NPDES authority.  Save the
Valley v. EPA, 99 F. Supp. 2d 981, 984–85 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (rejecting EPA’s motion to dismiss
and holding statutory language compelled conclusion that EPA must initiate withdrawal proceed-
ings if it has actual knowledge of widespread state failures); see Save the Valley v. EPA, 223 F.
Supp. 2d 997, 1014–15 (S.D. Ind. 2002) (holding, on cross-motions for summary judgment, that
withdrawal of state authorization was not yet warranted but ordering state to bring program into
compliance).  Most courts have rejected Save the Valley. See, e.g., Del. Cnty., 2007 WL 4225580,
at *5 (File No. 22) (calling Save the Valley “against the vast weight of authority”); Sierra Club,
377 F. Supp. 2d at 1209 (File No. 25) (stating majority approach is better-reasoned); Johnson
Cnty., 2005 WL 2204953, at *4 (stating majority of courts have rejected Save the Valley).
160 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2006).
161 Johnson Cnty., 2005 WL 2204953, at *4.
162 These cases rely on Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).  In Heckler, the Supreme Court
held that the FDA’s decision not to initiate enforcement actions was discretionary and therefore
exempted from judicial review under the APA. Id. at 831–32.
163 Johnson Cnty., 2005 WL 2204953, at *4 (quoting Dubois v. Thomas, 820 F.2d 943, 948 (8th
Cir. 1987)).  Courts have echoed these concerns in a number of closely related contexts that are
outside the scope of our study.  Some plaintiffs file suits seeking withdrawal, rather than petition-
ing EPA; courts similarly reject such claims. E.g., Altman v. United States, No. 98-CV-237E(F),
2004 WL 3019171, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2004) (dismissing claim seeking withdrawal of New
York’s NPDES authority for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; “[t]he statute does not compel the
EPA either to hold a hearing or to make such a determination by any specific time, indicating that
the withdrawal provision is discretionary.”); Weatherby Lake Improvement Co. v. Browner, No.
96-1155-CV-W-8, 1997 WL 687656, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 17, 1997) (granting EPA’s motion to
dismiss; “To hold otherwise would frustrate the purposes of the Act by requiring the EPA to alter
its priorities and expend its limited resources to investigate citizen complaints, regardless of their
relative importance.”).  In another group of cases, EPA invited comments on all Title V programs
as a result of a litigation settlement; some commenters challenged EPA’s failure to withdraw state
authority after becoming aware of deficiencies. See, e.g., Ohio Pub. Interest Research Grp. v.
Whitman, 386 F.3d 792, 795–96 (6th Cir. 2004) (refusing to mandate EPA to initiate withdrawal,
even though it did not dispute deficiencies, because to do so was within EPA’s discretion); Pub.
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There is little case law on the question whether judicial review is available
in situations in which EPA formally denies a petition without commencing a
withdrawal proceeding.  We uncovered only one case, Legal Environmental As-
sistance Foundation v. EPA (“LEAF I”),164 in which a court reached the merits
at this stage.  The LEAF I court did not address the threshold issue of review-
ability on its way to holding EPA had incorrectly interpreted its statutory man-
date in denying a petition to revoke Alabama’s SDWA authorization.165  By
contrast, in another case challenging an EPA denial following an informal in-
vestigation, the court dismissed the challenge because of the discretionary na-
ture of the agency decision.166  In Texas Disposal Systems Landfill v. EPA, EPA
had provided a detailed rationale for its denial of a petition to withdraw Texas’s
RCRA authorization,167 and the petitioner challenged the denial in the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals,168 arguing that EPA’s decision was not simply a re-
fusal to enforce, but an informal adjudication accompanied by reviewable rea-
soning.169  The court summarily rejected that argument: “an action committed
to agency discretion does not become reviewable merely because the agency
gives a reviewable reason for an otherwise unreviewable action.”170
This judicial stance, combined with EPA’s approach of addressing peti-
tions informally, results in significant leeway and a lack of external checks on
EPA.  Most petition activity occurred at a stage where EPA’s discretion was at
its highest, making judicial review extremely rare for the vast majority of
petitions.171
Citizen v. EPA, 343 F.3d 449, 465 (5th Cir. 2003) (same); N.Y. Pub. Interest Research Grp. v.
Whitman, 321 F.3d 316, 332 (2d Cir. 2003) (same).
164 118 F.3d 1467 (1997) (File No. 29).
165 The fact of review is reconcilable with Heckler, which left open the possibility that review
might be available where the agency’s inaction was “based solely on the belief that it lacks juris-
diction.” Heckler, 470 U.S. at 843 n.4 (1985); see also Levin, supra note 154, at 759–60 (stating R
review should be available notwithstanding Heckler for questions of law, which are within judicial
competence to resolve).
166 This is true even though a denial meets the finality requirement for purposes of reviewability.
See 5 U.S.C. § 704; 40 C.F.R. § 123.64(b)(8)(ii) (decision not to withdraw is “final agency ac-
tion”); Johnson Cnty., 2005 WL 2204953, at *6 (noting decision to withdraw or not to withdraw
CWA Petition would be final agency action reviewable in court of appeals).
167 See Determination as to Whether Cause Exists to Withdraw the Texas RCRA Program, Docket
No. TX/RCRA-06-2006-0001 (May 17, 2006) (File No. 7) (denying petition).
168 377 Fed. Appx. 406, 407 (5th Cir. 2010).
169 Id. at 408.
170 Id.; see ICC v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S. 270, 283 (1987) (rejecting principle that
“if the agency gives a ‘reviewable’ reason for otherwise unreviewable action, the action becomes
reviewable”); see also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 824–25 (1985) (holding unreviewable
FDA’s decision not to enforce; FDA had provided explanation for its decision).  Courts have re-
sponded similarly in related contexts, albeit outside the scope of our study. See Ohio Pub. Interest
Research Grp. v. Whitman, 386 F.3d 792, 795 (6th Cir. 2004) (describing EPA’s written response
to commenters’ request for issuance of NOD but dismissing for lack of subject-matter jurisdic-
tion); Pub. Citizen v. EPA, 343 F.3d 449, 455 (5th Cir. 2004) (same); N.Y. Pub. Interest Research
Grp. v. Whitman, 321 F.3d 316, 322 (2d Cir. 2003) (same).
171 There have been occasional judicial challenges to initial authorizations over the years. E.g.,
Citizens for a Better Env’t. v. EPA, 596 F.2d 720 (7th Cir. 1979) (overturning EPA approval of
Illinois NPDES program); Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 859 F.2d 156, 172–189 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (upholding EPA’s regulations specifying requirements for states to gain NPDES authority).
These are beyond the scope of our study.
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2. Withdrawal Proceedings
Once EPA commences a withdrawal proceeding, there appears to be little
question that its final determination would be reviewable.172  But over the past
twenty-five years, EPA has initiated a formal withdrawal proceeding on its
own173 for only four petitions.174  One proceeding took place in connection with
a RCRA program, and the other three involved Notices of Deficiency
(“NODs”) issued in connection with CAA Title V programs.175  None of these
proceedings resulted in a withdrawal of state authority, and only the RCRA
petition resulted in a judicial challenge, which was unsuccessful on the
merits.176
To summarize, our results reflect a strong EPA preference to resolve peti-
tions informally rather than through formal withdrawal proceedings.  Further,
EPA has been able to act on its preferences and largely avoid such proceedings.
It is likely that EPA’s approach has been motivated by several factors.  Among
others, EPA would prefer not to take over program administration, but it is
obligated to do so upon finding that a state is not meeting the applicable criteria
172 Were EPA to withdraw a state’s authorization, that action would not be subject to Heckler,
because as described by that Court: “[W]hen an agency does act to enforce, that action itself
provides a focus for judicial review, inasmuch as the agency must have exercised its power in
some manner.” Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832 (1985).  Were EPA to decline to withdraw authorization,
a suit to enforce nondiscretionary duties would lie because the relevant statutes provide that EPA
“shall” or “will” withdraw approval after making certain findings and if the state fails to cure
deficiencies. See Sierra Club, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 1207 (emphasizing mandatory nature of word
“shall” in CWA, 33 U.S.C. 1342(c)(3)); see also RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6926(e) (2006) (providing
Administrator “shall” withdraw when certain conditions are met); 40 C.F.R. § 70.10(b)(3) & (4)
(2013) (establishing when CAA withdrawal is mandatory).
173 With respect to the LEAF petition, EPA initiated proceedings to withdraw Alabama’s SDWA
program to comply with a judicial mandate. See Legal Envtl. Assistance Found. v. EPA (LEAF
II), 276 F.3d 1253, 1255–1256 (11th Cir. 2001) (describing history) (File No. 29); supra text
accompanying notes 164–165 (same). R
174 Formal withdrawal proceedings entail notice, opportunities for states and others to be heard,
and opportunities for states to correct any deficiencies prior to a final withdrawal decision. See,
e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 123.64 (setting forth withdrawal procedures for revoking CWA authorization).
The other regulatory schemes operate similarly, providing notice-and-hearing procedures for the
state and opportunities for the state to correct any deficiencies before a final withdrawal decision
is made. See Procedures for Withdrawing Approval of State Programs, 40 C.F.R.
§ 271.23(b)(1)–(8) (2013) (detailing procedures under RCRA); 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(i)(1)-(4) (de-
tailing Notice of Deficiency procedures under CAA); 40 C.F.R. § 70.10(b)(2)(i) (describing fur-
ther CAA procedures); Procedures for Withdrawal of State Programs, 40 C.F.R. § 145.34(b)
(2013) (detailing procedures under SDWA).
175 In re Proceedings to Determine Whether to Withdraw Approval of North Carolina’s Hazardous
Waste Management Program, No. RCRA-SHWPAW-IV-01-87, at 2 (Apr. 11, 1990) (PETN
003235; File No. 9); Notice of Deficiency for Clean Air Act Operating Permit Program in Wiscon-
sin, 69 Fed. Reg. 10,167 (Mar. 4, 2004) (File No. 10); Notice of Deficiency for Clean Air Operat-
ing Permits Program in Ohio, 67 Fed. Reg. 19,175 (Apr. 18, 2002) (File No. 8); Notice of
Deficiency for Clean Air Act Operating Permits Program in Oregon, 63 Fed. Reg. 65,783 (Nov.
30, 1998) (File No. 9b).  The states took corrective actions in response to the NODs, and the
matters proceeded no further.
176 See Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. Reilly, 938 F.2d 1390, 1395–96 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(File No. 9) (upholding EPA denial of Petition, which was based on interpretation of RCRA regu-
lations, under highly deferential Seminole Rock standard).
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and has failed to cure deficiencies.  This state of affairs provides a strong incen-
tive to avoid initiating a formal withdrawal process at all.
The implications for legitimacy are two-fold.  First, recall from the discus-
sion above that courts have elaborated procedural requirements for some deci-
sion-making procedures, such as those applicable to rulemakings, in ways that
further agency legitimacy.  Those constraints are not present in the petition-to-
withdraw context because there are no mandatory duties except that EPA re-
spond to petitions.  Instead, the nature, speed, and scope of the response are
within the agency’s discretion.  Second, because EPA has such discretion at the
informal stage and because most petitions proceed no further, EPA’s decisions
rarely are scrutinized by the courts.  Our study, therefore, asks how EPA
behaves without this external mechanism for legitimacy — a question to which
we now turn.
III. APPLICATION OF INSIDE-OUT LEGITIMACY METRICS TO EPA
PETITION-TO-WITHDRAW PROCESS
In this section, we apply the legitimacy metrics developed in Part I to the
petition context and data described in Part II.  In order to assess the legitimacy
of the process from the inside-out, we considered: (1) how the process is used;
(2) EPA’s treatment of petitions, including responsiveness and reason-giving;
and (3) substantive outcomes.177
A. Metric 1: How the Petition Process Is Used
As noted above, evaluating how the process is used performs two func-
tions.  First, the extent of use provides a critical check on our conception of
legitimacy.  Even if EPA treats petitions in ways that further legitimacy accord-
ing to our metrics, we would need to question whether the process could be
called legitimate if it were not used.  Second, how the procedure is used pro-
vides insights about the concerns that have been raised and who has raised
them (which relates to access to the process).  These details also provide predi-
cate information for the legitimacy analysis that follows from our other metrics.
To consider the process’s extent of use, we wanted to understand: (1) how
many petitions have been filed; (2) trends over time in the filing of petitions;
(3) for which statutory programs petitions have sought withdrawal and whether
particular programs were targeted more than others; (4) whether the number of
petitions varied by region and state; (5) the types of concerns about program
implementation the petitions raised; and (6) the characteristics of the petitioners
themselves.
Of the 58 petitions we studied, the first was filed in 1987 and the most
recent was filed in December 2011.178  Initially, there were very few petitions,
177 See supra Part I.C. (developing framework).
178 Mean = 2.6 per year; median = 2.5; mode = 1; standard deviation = 1.5.
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until the pace picked up slightly beginning in 1996.179  Over the next sixteen
years (through the end of 2011), fifty-one petitions were filed, averaging
slightly more than three per year.180
FIGURE 1: NUMBER OF PETITIONS FILED PER YEAR, 1987–2011
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Given the small number of petitions filed each year, it is not appropriate to
draw strong conclusions about variations in use of the process over time, other
than to observe that over the past several years, use has been modest but sus-
tained.  Interested parties have neither abandoned the process, which would
signal a perception that it lacks value compared to the effort required and alter-
natives available, nor have they significantly increased their use, which would
signal petitioners’ view that the benefits of the process made it worthwhile to
pursue.181
179 Congress enacted and amended the various environmental regulatory statutes at different times.
Further, states sought and EPA delegated authority for program implementation over an extended
time period. See EPA, STATE REVIEW FRAMEWORK, available at http://www.epa.gov/oecaerth/
state/srf/index.html (last updated Nov. 21, 2012) (presenting map showing state authorizations).
180 For statistics about the level of citizen suit activity during this time period, see James R. May,
Now More Than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits at 30, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 1, 2
(2003) (providing overview).
181 The NAFTA Labor Commission experience is an example of the former type of process. See
David Markell, The Role of Spotlighting Procedures in Promoting Citizen Participation, Trans-
parency, and Accountability, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 425, 434 (2010) (describing decline in
petitions submitted under NAFTA labor side agreement).  For an example showing variable use of
a process by citizens in Canada, Mexico, and the United States, see Knox & Markell, supra note
93, at 520–21 (empirically describing use of citizen petition process before Commission for Envi- R
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We also considered the statutes at issue in the petitions.  The CWA was at
the heart of petition activity; other statutes received more limited attention.  Al-
legedly deficient state performance of CWA-related duties was raised in more
than two-thirds of the petitions (41), almost three times more than with any
other statute.182  Other than the CWA, the statutory programs for which peti-
tions sought withdrawal included the CAA, RCRA, SDWA, and CERCLA.183
Figure 2 (on the left side) presents the statutes petitioners targeted.
FIGURE 2: REGULATORY PROGRAMS TARGETED & NUMBER OF PETITIONS
BY EPA REGION
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Our data also revealed considerable geographic variability in the number
of petitions filed.  As Figure 2 (on the right side) reflects, almost half of the
petitions were filed in two EPA regions, Regions 4 and 5, accounting for
twenty-six of the petitions.184  On the other hand, no petitions were filed in
Region 2 and only two were filed involving Region 1.185
To understand the types of concerns petitioners raised, we developed six
variables based on the statutory and regulatory requirements for authorization:
opportunities for citizen participation, permitting, inspections, enforcement,
state resources, and state legal authorities.186  As described in Part II, a state
ronmental Cooperation).  For other examples, see David L. Markell, Understanding Citizen Per-
spectives on Government Decision Making Processes as a Way to Improve the Administrative
State, 36 ENVTL. L. 651, 666–670 (2006).
182 Six petitions sought revocation for more than one statutory program.  For details, see the
Appendix.
183 With respect to CERCLA, we note that this statutory scheme does not include state authoriza-
tion. See ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 857–62
(6th ed. 2011) (providing overview of CERCLA).
184 Region 5 covers the Great Lakes, while Region 4 covers the Southeast.
185 Region 1 covers New England, while Region 2 includes New Jersey and New York.  Targeting
by state varied as well.  Alabama, which is in Region 4, was targeted in seven petitions, which
was the greatest number of any state. Most states had fewer than three petitions.  Petitioners in
different regions also varied which regulatory programs they targeted.  For example, about 85% of
the petitioners in Region 5 focused on the CWA, while in Region 4, about 54% of the petitions
involved the CWA.  Additional information about the states, regions, and programs targeted by
petitions is presented in the Appendix.
186 Our initial review of the petitions revealed that most concerns raised fit easily within the six
categories, but we also included a catch-all “other” category to capture any additional concerns
raised.  Examples of concerns coded as “other” included environmental justice, conflicts of inter-
est, and data management issues.
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must show that it meets these requirements before EPA will authorize the state
to administer a program, and widespread failure to perform in one or more of
these areas provides grounds for EPA to withdraw state authority.
Table 1 reflects that inadequate state legal authorities were the focus of
petitions more often than any other complaint.  Permitting concerns ranked a
close second.
TABLE 1. CONCERNS RAISED
(Includes all petitions; n = 58)
Concern Number of Times Raised Percentage of Total Petitions
Inadequate citizen participation 32 55.2%
Inadequate permitting 43 74.1%
Inadequate inspections 25 43.1%
Inadequate enforcement 31 53.4%
Inadequate state resources 17 29.3%
Inadequate state authorities 46 79.3%
Other 11 19.0%
We also investigated the identity and backgrounds of the petitioners.  We
evaluated petitioners to determine whether they were local environmental non-
governmental organizations (“ENGOs”), national ENGOs, individuals, corpo-
rate entities, or government entities.  Several findings were of interest.  First,
local participation in the process was high, with local ENGOs participating in
46 of the 58 petitions (nearly 80%).  In addition, individuals participated in 9
(16%) of the petitions.187  National ENGOs were active as well, participating in
28, or 48%, of the petitions.188  Further, the local ENGOs often collaborated
with national ENGOs in developing petitions; 82% of petitions filed by na-
tional ENGOs (23 of the 28) were joined by local ENGOs.189  Corporate entities
filed two petitions.190
187 Although we were not able to verify every individual’s place of residence, it seems reasonable
to presume they were citizens of the states for which they sought withdrawal.  So understood,
local petitioners were represented in nearly 90% of the petitions.
188 Coders distinguished local and national ENGOs based on their affiliations.  For example, Sierra
Club chapters were coded as national ENGOs because of their national affiliations, even though
they also have a local focus.
189 Local governments were petitioners along with nine environmental groups seeking withdrawal
of Virginia’s authority to administer the NPDES program because of Virginia’s limitations on
judicial review of final NPDES permits. See Letter from Robert Perciasepe, Assistant Adm’r,
EPA, to Katherine E. Slaughter, S. Envtl. Law Ctr. (Dec. 8, 1993) (PETN 011435; File No. 50)
(describing petitioners and concerns raised).
190 These petitions were of special interest because it may seem counter-intuitive for a regulated
entity to argue that a state is failing to effectuate the minimum federal environmental require-
ments.  One of the petitions filed by a corporate entity sought withdrawal of North Carolina’s
authority to administer the RCRA program after the state legislature passed a law that prevented
the corporation from siting a hazardous waste treatment facility in a particular geographic area. In
re Proceedings to Determine Whether to Withdraw Approval of North Carolina’s Hazardous
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Related to access to the petition process, more than 80% of the petitions
were filed by attorneys.191  Consistent with the significant extent of attorney
involvement, the petitions were very sophisticated.  The vast majority of peti-
tions cited the applicable statute, evidenced an understanding of the petition-to-
withdraw process, supported concerns with factual specificity, and applied the
legal standards to the facts in supporting their claims.192
The above extent-of-use data suggest several insights about the legitimacy
of the petition process.  First, the generally sustained, though modest, use of the
process over time lends some support to the idea that it enjoys at least some
level of legitimacy or usefulness.  Second, the many variations in petitioners’
use of the process (by region, state, and program area) and types of concerns
raised suggest a host of important questions that deserve further study.  We
consider some of these issues in Part IV.  For now, we note that the concerns
raised generally track the statutory requirements for program implementation,
making them useful for assessing conformity to statute.
Finally, the identity of the users of the process raises important questions
about accessibility.  Sophisticated petitions developed by sophisticated petition-
ers may be more likely to elicit a meaningful response from EPA and lead to
measurable outcomes.  On the other hand, barriers to access, real or perceived,
may narrow the universe of potential participants and undermine the value of
petitions as an outlet for voice.193  The interactions between petitioners and the
roles of petitions in ENGOs’ overall strategies also merit further study.194
Waste Management Program, No. RCRA-SHWPAW-IV-01-87, at 1 (Apr. 11, 1990) (PETN
003235; File No. 9) (describing facts); see also Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. Reilly, 938
F.2d 1390 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (upholding EPA decision not to withdraw).  The other petition simi-
larly related to a corporation’s specific circumstances as a regulated entity under RCRA. See
generally Letter from Richard W. Lowerre & James B. Blackburn, Jr., to Stephen L. Johnson, EPA
Adm’r, & Richard Green, EPA Regional Adm’r, Region VI (Nov. 14, 2005) (PETN 001884; File
No. 7) (Re: Petition for Withdrawal of Program Approval for Texas RCRA Hazardous Waste
Program).  An attempt to challenge EPA’s denial of the petition was dismissed in federal court for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.  Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill v. EPA, 377 Fed. Appx. 406, 408
(5th Cir. 2010) (upholding dismissal and citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985)).
191 We initially coded for attorney involvement if apparent from the face of a petition, such as
where bar numbers were used.  If it was not apparent whether an individual associated with a
petition was an attorney, we used Google to search the individual’s name to identify any bar
memberships.
192 Additional information about the petitions’ sophistication and coding methodology is on file
with the authors.
193 On the trade-offs between access and other process-design features, see David L. Markell &
Tom R. Tyler, Using Empirical Research to Design Government Citizen Participation Mecha-
nisms: A Case Study of Citizens’ Roles in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement, 57 U.
KAN. L. REV. 1, 9–12 (2008).
194 For example, the coordination between the local and national ENGOs raises questions about
the extent to which procedures may provide a mechanism for enriching civil society. See Knox &
Markell, supra note 93, at 528 (suggesting citizen petition process for CEC has resulted in in- R
creased civic engagement, in part through greater coordination between environmental organiza-
tions in multiple countries).  In addition, the relationship between the ENGOs’ petitions, other
activities, and funding sources may be of interest. See Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakehold-
ers: Limits On Collaboration as the Basis for Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411,
463 (2000) (evaluating relationship between citizen suits and interest groups’ funding).
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In summary, our use metrics provide both a potential backstop on our
conceptions of legitimacy and a detailed understanding of how petitioners have
used the process throughout the country to raise concerns about different regu-
latory programs.  Our findings raise some concerns about variability and ac-
cess, which we take up in more detail in Part III.D. below.  First, we consider
the results of our other legitimacy metrics, beginning with how EPA treated the
petitions.
B. Metric 2: Treatment of Petitions — Responsiveness and Reason-Giving
EPA’s treatment of petitions provides the major testing ground for consid-
ering EPA behavior under our framework.  As described above, measures of
EPA’s responsiveness to the petitions and reason-giving for outcomes are criti-
cal in assessing legitimacy for several reasons.  Taken together, responsiveness
and reason-giving reinforce participation, voice, respectful treatment, and trust;
they also provide evidence of deliberation, transparency, and neutrality, and
further accountability.  In addition, to the extent reason-giving reflects an anal-
ysis of how the facts relate to the governing environmental statute, it promotes
fidelity to the statutory mandate.  This section explains the questions we asked
about the petitions’ treatment, how we developed the related variables, and the
findings that emerged from the data.
As described above, judicial review of agency procedures enhances legiti-
macy in part by ensuring at least some responsiveness by the agency.  In the
rulemaking context, for example, courts check agency behavior to evaluate
whether agencies have fulfilled their obligation to respond to significant com-
ments raised.  Borrowing from this legitimizing doctrine, we coded whether
and how often EPA acknowledged concerns raised and described an outcome
with respect to each.195  As Table 2 reflects, EPA referenced concerns and de-
scribed outcomes about 82% of the time.196  For concerns about inadequate citi-
zen participation, EPA acknowledged such concerns and explained the outcome
of EPA’s efforts to address them more than 90% of the time.  EPA was not as
responsive with respect to concerns about state resources, permitting, and in-
spections, but it still acknowledged the concerns raised and explained the out-
come of EPA’s investigation of them for over 70% of the petitions that raised
them.  These data show a considerable degree of agency responsiveness; EPA
regularly acknowledged and responded to significant issues petitioners raised.
195 Often, EPA sent a letter to petitioners describing the agency’s final decision on the petition.  If
such a letter was present, we used it as our source for coding the variables.  If such a letter was not
present, we obtained our information from interim status letters to petitioners, EPA notices in the
Federal Register, written agreements between EPA and the state agency that were provided to
petitioners, and other written communications sent directly to petitioners or to which petitioners
were given access.
196 We omitted those petitions coded as still pending from our analysis.  Petitions were coded as
still pending where our files evidenced activity after December 31, 2009, but where a final deci-
sion or resolution had not been reached.  Recall as well that we expect our data to under-represent
responsiveness. See supra notes 131, 137 (explaining limitations of source documents). R
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TABLE 2. RESPONSIVENESS BY TYPE OF CONCERN RAISED
(Petitions still pending omitted; n = 46)197
Number of Times Percent of Responses Percent of Responses
Concern Was Acknowledging Describing Outcome
Raised Concern (Frequency) (Frequency)
Inadequate citizen participation 25 96.0% (24) 92.0% (23)
Inadequate permitting 33 75.7% (25) 75.7% (25)
Inadequate inspections 17 76.5% (13) 82.4% (14)
Inadequate enforcement 20 85.0% (17) 90.0% (18)
Inadequate state resources 11 72.7% (8) 72.7% (8)
Inadequate state authorities 38 81.6% (31) 81.6% (31)
Other 9 77.8% (7) 77.8% (7)
Aggregate 153 81.7% (125) 82.4% (126)
In addition to assessing EPA’s responsiveness to petitioner concerns, we
developed metrics to evaluate EPA’s performance in reason-giving.  As empha-
sized above, the courts’ requirement that agencies give reasons for their actions
is a feature of hard-look review, which provides a fundamental bulwark for the
legitimacy of agency actions.  Using the typical formulations of the hard-look
standard, we assessed whether EPA explained its outcomes using the data or
information on which the decisions were based, and in light of the applicable
legal standards.198  We also coded whether EPA explained the process it used in
reaching its decision.199
As Table 3 reflects, EPA included the data upon which it based its deci-
sion, and explained its decision in light of legal standards, nearly 70% of the
time.  That is, EPA appears to have conformed, at least at a basic level, to the
norms of reasoned decisionmaking about 70% of the time.
These findings strike us as meaningful because of what they suggest about
the promise of agency procedures to provide inside-out legitimacy.  EPA typi-
cally was responsive and engaged in reason-giving even though there was no
statutory or judicial requirement that it do so and even though the likelihood of
judicial review was remote.  With respect to responsiveness specifically, our
data suggest that EPA performed well, describing concerns and outcomes
reached over 80% of the time.  As noted previously, this agency behavior rein-
forces the value of participation, and promotes transparency and accountability.
197 In two instances — one each for inspections and enforcement — EPA described an outcome
that was not raised in a petition.
198 Due to data constraints and related variability and reliability concerns, we did not code the
reason-giving variables according to each concern raised.  Although EPA often engaged in reason-
giving as it discussed each concern raised, it sometimes referenced each concern and described
each outcome, but later aggregated its discussion of legal standards and data.  This may explain
why EPA did better in aggregate responsiveness than it did in aggregate reason-giving.
199 While not strictly a component of the judicial formulation of the reason-giving requirement,
explaining the procedures used furthers other legitimizing principles associated with reason-giv-
ing, like treatment with respect.
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TABLE 3.  REASON-GIVING
(Petitions still pending omitted; n = 46)
Process,
Both Data & Data, &
Explained Included Used Legal Legal Legal
Process Data Standards Standards Standards
Percent of petitions for
which reason-giving 71.7% (33) 78.3% (36) 76.1% (35) 69.6% (32) 65.2% (30)
occurred (frequency)
It also provides a disciplining check on agency discretion, which protects
against arbitrariness.200
Reason-giving, of course, does heavy lifting for legitimacy, so EPA’s pro-
viding reasons in its treatment of more than 2/3 of the petitions similarly is a
promising sign about the possibilities for inside-out legitimacy.  Reason-giving
provides evidence of deliberation; it also provides justifications, furthering the
perception that decisions were reached fairly and not arbitrarily.  Additionally,
reason-giving is a critical component of transparency, which in turn enables
accountability.  Thus, the reason-giving we observed here ought to facilitate
both outside-in and inside-out legitimacy.
We highlight one important limitation to our findings.  While we measured
the extent to which EPA gave reasons, we were not able to measure the quality
of EPA’s reason-giving.201  Nor can we presume, based simply on the presence
of reason-giving, that those reasons would satisfy courts or other stakehold-
ers.202  Even so, we view the high rates of reason-giving as a useful indicator of
baseline legitimacy because if an agency does not even make an effort to ex-
plain itself in the first place, it is difficult to hold it accountable or consider its
behavior internally legitimate, whether in court or otherwise.
200 Borrowing from the procedural justice literature, such behavior strengthens voice and reflects
respect for participants, and also reinforces a sense of neutrality and builds trust. See supra Part
I.B.2.
201 Doing so would have required substantive assessment of the merits of the petitioners’ claims
and EPA’s and the states’ responses, which was beyond the scope of this study and furthermore
would have introduced significant reliability and replicability problems into our dataset.
202 To put this limitation in perspective, empirical research shows that EPA prevails on the sub-
stantive merits between one-half and two-thirds of the time when its rules are challenged. See,
e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, No Intelligible Principles: The EPA’s Record in Federal Court, REASON
FOUNDATION 10–11 (May 1, 2000), available at http://reason.org/news/show/no-intelligible-prin-
ciples (presenting empirical results showing EPA won only about two-thirds of substantive chal-
lenges to its rules in the D.C. Circuit); Christopher H. Schroeder & Robert L. Glicksman,
Chevron, State Farm, and EPA in the Courts of Appeals During the 1990s, 31 ENVTL. L. REP.
10371, 10374 (2001) (presenting empirical results showing EPA won only about half of substan-
tive challenges to its rules between 1990 and 1999). Because rules are generally reviewable, we
would expect EPA to engage in the various judicially created reasoning and analysis requirements
described above.  Thus, we would expect EPA to have scored well had we evaluated rulemakings
for the presence of reason-giving — even if the quality of that reasoning was deficient.
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C. Metric 3: Substantive Outcomes
Our final metric, substantive outcomes, is crucial to a complete under-
standing of the petition process and its legitimacy.  When courts evaluate
agency actions, they consider whether the outcomes are within the parameters
of the statutory mandate.  This check furthers legitimacy by ensuring that agen-
cies exercise only the power they are given.  Additionally, the desirability of a
procedure depends in part on its ability to generate meaningful outcomes.  If
results seem unobtainable, or failures a foregone conclusion, the process will be
perceived as arbitrary, inaccessible, and otherwise illegitimate.  Thus, this met-
ric helps evaluate how substantive outcomes may impact the legitimacy of the
administrative state.203
One plausible measure for evaluating substantive outcomes of the petition
process is whether EPA ultimately withdrew authority in response to petitions;
after all, that is the petitions’ purported purpose.  On this measure, the process
might look like a resounding failure: as noted above, EPA initiated a with-
drawal proceeding less than 10% of the time, in only 4 instances,204 and never
withdrew state authorization.205
Yet there are good reasons why withdrawal should not be viewed as the
exclusive (or even a particularly good) measure of desirable substantive out-
comes.  A cooperative federalism system that produces outcomes in which the
federal government withdraws a state’s authorization — on the ground that
state performance is so bad that salvaging the partnership is beyond the realm
of possibility — is difficult to conceive of as a benchmark demonstrating the
success of such a system.206 For these reasons, it is not surprising that our data
are consistent with the perception of commentators and insiders alike: with-
drawal is a “nuclear weapon” that is likely to be used rarely if at all.
As Professor Brigham Daniels notes in his analysis of agencies’ nuclear
options, however, “[w]hat we don’t hear enough about is what falls between a
dud and regulatory Armageddon.”207  While EPA never formally withdrew a
203 The political science literature makes a distinction between procedural accomplishments, like
writing rules or bringing enforcement actions, and outcomes, like reducing pollution or diminish-
ing health risks. See RENA STEINZOR & SID SHAPIRO, THE PEOPLE’S AGENTS AND THE BATTLE TO
PROTECT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 188–89 (2010) (describing distinction and collecting sources).
Our study focuses on the former; we are not able to assess, for example, whether state water
quality is better overall because of a petition being filed. See GAO, Water Quality: Inconsistent
State Approaches Complicate Nation’s Efforts to Identify Its Most Polluted Waters, GAO-02-186
(Jan. 11, 2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-186 (identifying obstacles to
EPA’s attempt to inventory impaired waters); Markell, Slack, supra note 18, at 28 (explaining why R
cooperative federalism model has made it more difficult to assess what government officials
accomplish).
204 See supra text accompanying notes 173–176 (describing these results). R
205 Our research revealed two instances where EPA withdrew state programs (in California and
Maryland), but those were not in response to petitions and were therefore outside the scope of our
study. See supra note 24 (collecting sources). R
206 Of course, an alternative perspective is that making an example of a recalcitrant state may set a
more constructive tone for cooperative federalism and ultimately yield improved results generally
and in that state itself. RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 23, at 332. R
207 Daniels, supra note 111, at 471. R
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program and rarely commenced proceedings, it also virtually never simply de-
nied a petition or ignored it.  Instead, we documented that EPA nearly always
engaged in an informal investigation following receipt of a petition.  And in
many instances, the agency investigated the concerns in depth, agreed that defi-
ciencies existed, and worked with the state to address those concerns.208 Fur-
thermore, we noticed that substantive outcomes short of withdrawal
proceedings were achieved in many instances.
In short, based on the premise that final withdrawal should not be consid-
ered the only important substantive outcome of the petition process, we created
outcome variables based on the six types of concerns that correlate with the
statutory criteria for authorization and withdrawal: whether there were measur-
able changes in citizen participation, permitting, inspections, enforcement, state
resources, state legal authority, and in “other” areas of concern raised.209
As Table 4 reflects, in the aggregate, states made measurable changes in
how they administer environmental programs 53% of the time.  The highest
percentage of changes was in enforcement, while the lowest was in state
resources.
TABLE 4. SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOMES BY TYPE OF CONCERN
(Petitions still pending omitted; n = 46)
Number of Times Concern Percentage of Times Outcome
Was Raised Was Achieved (Frequency)
Inadequate citizen participation 25 52.0% (13)
Inadequate permitting 33 51.5% (17)
Inadequate inspections 17 52.9% (9)
Inadequate enforcement 20 65.0% (13)
Inadequate state resources 11 45.4% (5)
Inadequate state legal
authorities 38 50.0% (19)
Other 9 55.6% (5)
Aggregate 153 52.9% (81)
It may be helpful to contextualize our data regarding substantive out-
comes.  As noted above, the most frequently raised concern was inadequate
208 See supra text accompanying notes 139–144 (providing example). R
209 We use the word “measurable” to convey that the state committed to making changes in a
given category that would be capable of independent verification.  We did not independently ver-
ify (a) the baseline level of compliance with statutory criteria; (b) whether these changes were
actually made; or (c) whether the petitions caused the changes.  For purposes of our study, we
presume that the baseline performance of states in areas of concern raised were lower than those
achieved following a petition.  But any number of factors may engender changes in state perform-
ance, such as routine EPA oversight, developments at the state level, etc. We were not able to
control for factors that, in addition to or instead of the petitions, may have caused these substan-
tive changes.  Based on our review of the files, however, we believe the petitions provided at least
some of the impetus for many of the changes.
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state authorities, with petitions helping to produce substantive outcomes ad-
dressing these concerns 50% of the time these concerns were raised.  To pro-
vide an example, in 1996 various ENGOs sought withdrawal of Oregon’s CAA
Title V and CWA NPDES authorizations, arguing that under a new Oregon
Supreme Court decision, the state fell short of EPA’s public participation re-
quirements because it no longer recognized representational standing.210  After
EPA received an opinion from the Oregon Department of Justice questioning
whether Title V required state programs to provide representational standing,
EPA issued a Notice of Deficiency.211  Thereafter, the state legislature amended
its Title V statute to meet federal representational standing requirements, which
EPA approved.212  As for the NPDES program, EPA continued to encourage the
state to amend that program’s statutes as well, expressing its view that that
program remained deficient.213  Ultimately, the state department of justice pro-
vided an interpretation of intervening case law that satisfied EPA that the state’s
representational standing for NPDES programs met federal requirements.214
A 2001 petition filed by the Tulane Environmental Law Clinic asking EPA
to withdraw Louisiana’s NPDES program provides another example.  The Gov-
ernor of Louisiana convened a special Governor’s Task Force to investigate the
issues raised in the Petition while Region 6 initiated an informal investiga-
tion.215  EPA’s activities included on-site reviews of Louisiana’s files, interviews
with state management staff, and the region’s review of program implementa-
tion information that the state provided to EPA.216  After EPA reported that it
had “serious concerns” with aspects of the NPDES programs, the state devel-
oped a series of performance measures to address these concerns.217  The mea-
sures included improving permit issuance, enhancing public access to its files,
and improving its enforcement penalty calculation methodology to recover eco-
nomic benefit from non-compliance.218  The state agreed to address these con-
cerns,219 and EPA determined that cause did not exist to initiate withdrawal
proceedings.220  In doing so EPA noted that it had established seven perform-
210 See Letter from Karl G. Anuta, Esq., to Michael Clark, Reg’l Dir., EPA Region 10 (Aug. 1,
1996) (PETN 004768; File No. 19a) (citing Local No. 290, Plumbers and Pipefitters v. Or. Dep’t
of Envtl. Quality, 919 P.2d 1168 (Or. 1996)).
211 Notice of Deficiency for Clean Air Act Operating Permits Program in Oregon, 63 Fed. Reg.
65,783, 65,784 (Nov. 30, 1998).
212 Clean Air Act Approval of Revisions to Operating Permits Program in Oregon, 67 Fed. Reg.
39,630, 39,631 (June 10, 2002).
213 See Letter from Charles E. Findlay, Reg’l Adm’r, EPA Region 10, to Stephanie Hallock, Or.
Dep’t of Envtl. Quality (Feb. 8, 2001) (PETN 004867; File No. 19b).
214 Letter from Elin D. Miller, Reg’l Adm’r, EPA Region 10, to Karl G. Anuta, Esq. (Mar. 27,
2007) (PETN 004733; File No. 19b).
215 Letter from G. Tracy Mehan, III, Assistant Adm’r for Water, and John Peter Suarez, Assistant
Adm’r for Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, to the Honorable M.J. Foster, Jr., Governor of
La. (Feb. 14, 2003) (PETN 005910; File No. 27a).
216 Id.
217 See id. at 2.
218 Id. (Enclosure).
219 Letter from the Honorable M.J. Foster, Jr., Governor of La., to the Honorable Christine Todd
Whitman, Adm’r, EPA (Mar. 27, 2003) (PETN 005901; File No. 27a).
220 Letter from Richard E. Greene, Reg’l. Adm’r., EPA Region 6, to Adam Babich, Tulane Envtl.
Law Clinic, at 2 (Dec. 29, 2004) (PETN 005802) (on file with authors).
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ance measures “aimed at addressing EPA’s and citizen’s concerns with the pro-
gram,” and that “[w]e believe that [the state] has successfully completed all
seven performance measures and . . . that [it] is implementing the changes
agreed to as a result of the performance measures.  The [state] program has
shown marked improvement.”221
The experience of the 2001 Louisiana petition helps illustrate a further
point, as well as a qualification for our results.  Despite EPA’s and others’222
view that the state met program requirements, others hold opposing views.  As
explained by the OIG in 2012: “Although the state completed the recom-
mended actions, the state’s poor performance persisted; our analysis found that
Louisiana has the lowest enforcement levels in Region 6 and is ranked in the
lower half for CWA and the lowest quartile for CAA and RCRA.”223  In other
words, it is not possible to gauge from the petitions how well a particular state
was performing when a petition was filed, or whether changes in state perform-
ance following a petition were sufficient to bring a state up to EPA expectations
or beyond.  Much of the difficulty stems from the dysfunctionality of the coop-
erative federalism approach, including confusion about metrics and lack of data
to evaluate performance.224  We consider this issue further below, noting for
now our reluctance to make overbroad inferences about what the petitions’ out-
comes mean in terms of how the various state programs are performing.
Even so, our results as to substantive outcomes overall are remarkable
because they run counter to the typical account of the potential for withdrawal,
which dismisses it as meaningless because withdrawal itself is so rare.225  In-
stead, the data reveal that changes in state performance occurred over half the
time following a petition.  At a minimum, the outcomes suggest that EPA
worked with states to make changes to improve performance in the program
areas the petitioners identified as deficient.  Ultimately, in many cases states
changed their behavior at least partially in response to the concerns raised.  Be-
cause our outcomes are linked to statutory requirements, moreover, we can
conclude that the petitions process furthered fidelity to statute, reinforcing the
legitimacy of agency behavior in that regard.226  In addition, these outcomes
suggest that the petition process is a meaningful procedure; its legitimacy is
reinforced because it can make a difference.
IV. INSIDE-OUT LEGITIMACY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
As should be apparent from the above discussion, our study of the peti-
tion-to-withdraw process offers many insights into the theory of inside-out le-
gitimacy and its practical implications.  Although we found many reasons to be
221 Id. at 1.
222 EIP Letter, supra note 150. R
223 OIG Report, supra note 27, at 70. R
224 We consider these issues infra Part IV.B.
225 See, e.g., Krotoszynzki, supra note 116, at 1635–36. R
226 Although we are not able to quantify compliance with statutory mandate, it is reasonable to
assume these changes bring performance closer to statutory requirements.
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optimistic about agency behavior, we also identified areas that could be im-
proved and raised questions that deserve future study.  In this section, we detail
these considerations and highlight their significance.
A. Promoting Inside-Out Legitimacy
Though we suggest room for improvement and further study below, the
extent to which the petition process shows indicia of legitimacy is remarkable,
notwithstanding widespread agreement that EPA’s nuclear option of withdrawal
is really a paper tiger.  If that is true, and all the relevant actors know it, what
features of the system’s design might incentivize the agency behavior we docu-
mented, particularly when there is little chance of judicial review?
Here we suggest some possibilities.  These include agency culture and pro-
fessionalism; proximity to constituencies; the fire-alarm tool; and the presence
of a nuclear option.  We do not argue that any of these possibilities would
independently suffice to promote the intrinsic legitimacy we observed; rather,
most scholars agree that various institutional-design features ought to be
layered to promote legitimacy.227  Nor do we claim that these possibilities are
exhaustive.228  Rather, they are features of the institutional structure surround-
ing the petition process that seem especially likely to hold explanatory power
for the inside-out legitimacy we observed and that hold promise for institu-
tional design more broadly.  In suggesting them here, our hope is to push the
conversation about legitimacy towards a greater focus on the relationship be-
tween institutional structures, the details of agency behavior on the ground, and
inside-out legitimacy.
1. Professionalism and Agency Culture
Agency culture and professionalism can serve as internal legitimizers for
agency behavior.229  Together, they can promote neutral expertise230 and en-
courage agency professionals to serve as honest brokers231 in communicating
applicable scientific and technical information to higher-ups as well as their
227 E.g., Mendelson, supra note 8, at 419–20 (suggesting need for external controls even where R
internal legitimizing procedures, such as increased participation, have been implemented); see
Shapiro et al., supra note 60, at 486 (invoking notion of redundancy checks that utilize external R
and internal controls).
228 In particular, political control and centralization of power, at both the federal and state levels,
may hold explanatory value for agency behavior. See, e.g., Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political
Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889
(2008) (considering rulemaking behavior during political transitions in executive and legislative
branches).
229 See Shapiro & Wright, supra note 12, at 580.  Professors Shapiro and Wright identify bureau- R
cratic controls and professionalism as two key inside-out legitimizers. Id.  Of course, agency
culture can also undermine legitimacy.
230 See Shapiro et al., supra note 60, at 471, 484. R
231 See generally ROGER A. PIELKE, JR., THE HONEST BROKER: MAKING SENSE OF SCIENCE IN
POLICY AND POLITICS (2007) (suggesting roles for scientists in contributing to democracy in ways
consistent with ethics of their profession).
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views whether proposed policies are consistent with the statutory mandate.232
Culture and professionalism can foster an inclination to reach out to stakehold-
ers in search of dialogue233 and to be responsive to concerns raised.234  In addi-
tion, a professionally compiled record will facilitate transparency and, thus,
external accountability as well as intrinsic legitimacy.235  Collectively, these be-
haviors can further administrative law values, procedural justice, and fidelity to
statute.
A number of our files revealed that EPA’s regional staff exhibited many
professional attributes.  For example, our files included numerous letters from
EPA to other stakeholders; EPA often thanked the petitioners for their participa-
tion and otherwise conveyed that the petitions were being taken seriously.  In
addition, we note that attorneys often signed the documents in which EPA com-
municated its reasoning and outcomes to petitioners.  Attorneys, trained as they
are in providing explanations, may have contributed their professionalism in
this way.  Agency culture may have also contributed to the overall good per-
formance of EPA.  One consideration is whether EPA has so internalized the
expectation of judicial review that it treats even informal matters according to
the norms resulting from hard-look review.  Alternatively, the mere chance of
review — albeit remote — may supply the impetus for the legitimizing behav-
ior we observed.  Determining the extent to which judicial review has such
spillover effects might be a fruitful area for further study.
2. Proximity to Constituencies and “Nesting” of the Petition Process
in Ongoing Relationships
Another possible contribution to inside-out legitimacy involves the
agency’s proximity to constituencies and the way the petition process is nested
within ongoing relationships.  For example, like many agencies, EPA has re-
gional offices throughout the country that are physically located nearer corre-
sponding state offices than the agency’s Washington, D.C. headquarters.  EPA’s
regional offices have much closer institutional ties and relationships with state
officials than their headquarters’ counterparts; regional staff also may have
closer relationships with regulated entities and regulatory beneficiaries than
would exist between those same groups and agency headquarters.
While proximity and ongoing interactions could give rise to tight, exclu-
sionary relationships that undermine legitimacy, agencies have natural incen-
tives to cultivate cordial relations with their stakeholders.236  The petition files
232 See Shapiro et al., supra note 60, at 487. R
233 Id.
234 See Bratspies, supra note 16, at 619 (describing “internal cultures of accessibility and respon- R
siveness” as key components for building trust in regulators).
235 See Shapiro et al., supra note 60, at 497; see also Mendelson, supra note 8, at 435 (asserting R
that good-government concerns may motivate agencies to act transparently because they wish to
foster the perception that regulated entities are treated fairly).
236 See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 8, at 435 (“Agency officials typically like relationships with R
regulated entities to remain cordial, not only because they frequently interact with regulated enti-
ties, but also because those entities can be a critical source of information.”).  Additionally, the
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revealed that the vast majority of EPA work on the petitions was done at the
regional level, with little evidence of significant headquarters involvement, as
is the case for many EPA/state interactions.  Discussions took place against a
backdrop of relationships — relationships that existed prior to when petitions
were filed and that would persist after petitions were resolved.237  Though
fraught with considerable risks,238 this institutional arrangement presumably in-
creased the likelihood that the federal and state personnel working on the peti-
tions were also working closely together otherwise.  The presence of local
ENGO petitioners, in tandem with national groups, likely added spice to this
ongoing relationship and put pressure on both EPA and the states to produce
results responsive to the ENGOs’ concerns.239  In this way, the governance
structure positioned EPA as a mediator between states and ENGOs, perhaps
contributing to the availability and achievability of negotiated outcomes.
At the very least, our study suggests that further research might explore
whether there are benefits — in addition to the oft-touted detriments — to
organizing government in ways that facilitate proximity, particularly when
there is a prompt from outside parties that requires cooperation to advance.
The nesting of the process in a context of ongoing relationships between EPA
and a state likely means that the government actors have some incentive to get
along over the long term.  Thus, the fact that the petitions are handled in the
regions, like most program oversight, makes it more likely that the role of pre-
serving ongoing relationships will be important.
3. The Fire-Alarm Tool
The classic account of fire alarms provides that they are a means of con-
verting “the oversight job of a politician from active monitor to reactive servant
of affected constituencies.”240  In other words, it is very costly for political ac-
tors to track every decision an agency makes, but fire-alarm tools enable those
nested relationship promotes EPA’s incentives both to cooperate, and to avoid using the ultimate
threat of withdrawal too casually. See infra notes 271, 272 (noting importance of incremental R
options).
237 Professor Daniels describes this “related interdependence,” where repeat players are engaged
in many different negotiations, as a component of successful use of nuclear tools.  Daniels, supra
note 111, at 484–85 (explaining nuclear threats are more credible where they are tied to program- R
matic concerns that relate to how parties will behave in the future).
238 Some constituencies might prefer interaction with a single headquarters because of limited
resources or the inaccessibility of regional offices. See, e.g., Markell, Slack, supra note 18, at 44 R
(describing difficulty interested parties face in obtaining information from scattered state offices).
Further, lack of centralized EPA Headquarters oversight and direction has contributed to dramatic
disparities in agency behavior across regions, including in interactions with the states. See, e.g.,
OIG Report, supra note 27, at 11 (describing lack of direct authority). R
239 Moreover, the potential for withdrawal creates unusual alliances between ENGOs and the regu-
lated community; ENGOs can use it to “win political support for invigorating the state infrastruc-
ture,” while regulated entities may prefer enhanced state performance as “the devil they know.”
RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 23, at 333. R
240 McNollgast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the
Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 434 (1989) [hereinafter Structure] ; see also
McNollgast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
243 (1987) [hereinafter Instruments] .
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actors to wait to be notified by stakeholders if the implementation of a statutory
program is failing in some way.241  Once notified, those actors can exercise
their authority to put out fires should they see fit.
Although the origins of the fire-alarm theory lie in a traditional principal-
agent conceptualization of administrative law — the theory originally focused
on congressional oversight242 — fire alarms can provide notification to many
different actors.  In the petition context, for example, a petition can serve as a
fire alarm to state political actors, to EPA’s headquarters, to politicians in the
executive or legislative branches, and to other stakeholders.  One puzzle of the
petition process lies in the effectiveness of the fire alarm.  Traditional theory
holds that the effectiveness of fire alarms depends on the credibility of potential
consequences.243  Even though EPA’s “nuclear bomb” of withdrawal is not
likely a credible threat, the presence of a fire alarm may nevertheless further
administrative legitimacy by focusing both the immediately responsible gov-
ernment actors and the wide array of less directly involved players on the con-
cerns raised.244
This consequence of the petition process is consistent with the insights of
McNollgast and others, notably that procedures can induce improved agency
behavior by providing information to political and other actors and by en-
franchising stakeholders in the agency decisionmaking process.245  Much like
judicial review, then, fire alarms can facilitate both outside-in and inside-out
legitimacy.  By creating procedures that benefit certain types of stakeholders,
moreover, fire alarms can enhance (or undermine) substantive legitimacy by
channeling agency decisionmaking toward outcomes that would be most fa-
vored by the regulatory beneficiaries.
4. Presence of a Nuclear Option
Though rarely deployed, the mere presence of a nuclear option may also
drive legitimizing behavior.  Professor Daniels has cataloged the numerous de-
sign choices surrounding nuclear options and how those choices impact their
desirability and effectiveness as bargaining tools.246  We consider three such
design features of the petition-to-withdraw process that seem particularly sali-
ent: third-party access, opportunities for shaming, and incremental options.
First, as noted above, one reason for EPA’s reluctance to withdraw state
authority lies in the immense political ramifications that would attend such an
action.  Not only would withdrawal signal a dismal view of the cooperative
federalism relationship, it would upset the default system Congress put in
241 See also Bressman, Procedures, supra note 74, at 1752 (describing how administrative proce-
dures function as, and facilitate, fire alarms).
242 Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police
Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 167 (1984).
243 McNollgast, Structure, supra note 240, at 434. R
244 For example, we documented governor involvement in 8 of the petitions.
245 McNollgast, Instruments, supra note 240, at 244. R
246 For an exhaustive analysis of the many options and an insightful exploration of nuclear tools
generally, see Daniels, supra note 111. R
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place.  The potential for intense oversight and scrutiny — such as might come
from a state’s congresspeople were withdrawal to take place — serves as a
strong incentive for the agency to avoid even initiating such proceedings on its
own.247  With the ability of interested parties to at least partially access the
procedure, however, the dynamic shifts.  EPA must at the very least respond to
petitions.  In so doing, it is incentivized to treat this political hot potato with
care; whether or not it eventually finds cause to initiate proceedings, providing
a record of its analysis and showing some progress towards addressing con-
cerns supports the legitimacy of agency behavior in the eyes of potential
stakeholders.
Further, that interested parties rather than the agency itself can trigger the
process provides political cover to EPA.248  Because it must respond to petitions
to withdraw, it can use the mere fact of a petition to take a close look at how a
given state is performing and to press the state for changes.  Thus, EPA may
face less criticism — for being obtrusive or for abusing the cooperative federal-
ism relationship — when it can point to an outside petition rather than its own
initiative as the impetus for investigating a state program.  By framing its rea-
sons for an investigation in this way, EPA may preserve for itself more negoti-
ating power that, in the end, translates into measurable outcomes.
Additionally, the state and federal actors are undoubtedly familiar with
many of the ENGOs, but the petition process operates to formalize the role of
such ENGOs.  The process does not give the ENGOs a veto.  The impediments
to judicial review also limit ENGOs’ leverage.  But the procedure puts ENGOs
squarely at the table in the sense that they get to drive the conversation by
identifying their concerns.  Their presence as formal participants is also likely
to increase the governments’ incentives to be responsive to their concerns.  It
may give EPA leverage to encourage improvements in state performance; it
may also give state officials immediately responsible for performance leverage
with higher-up officials, legislators, the governor’s office, and others to shift
resources and make other changes likely to respond to concerns.
The process also both creates heightened opportunity for shaming for af-
fected states, and it may provide them with political cover to make changes.
Each of these dimensions of the process may motivate states to seek negotiated
resolutions that appear to be responsive to citizen concerns, especially if EPA
piles on with its independent assessment that deficiencies exist.
The most obvious incentive to be responsive is the embarrassment that a
withdrawal proceeding would cause a state.249  The desire to avoid such an im-
pact may well contribute to the states’ willingness to negotiate with EPA and
reach substantively meaningful outcomes.  The petition process provides op-
247 See supra text accompanying note 113 (describing these reasons). R
248 Third-party access to nuclear options can also enhance the credibility of the threat and leverage
uncertainty; petitioners increase the likelihood of withdrawal, which is more threatening than the
abstract possibility of it occurring. See Daniels, supra note 111, at 480, 483. R
249 RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 23, at 332 (A withdrawal proceeding “represents a R
public statement by EPA that the state’s program is entirely inadequate.  The prospect of being
branded in this way might well serve as strong motivation to state officials.”).
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portunities for shaming EPA as well.  For example, petitioners regularly make
use of the press to announce their petitions; while these articles focus on con-
demnation of state behavior, they also express similar disappointment with
EPA’s oversight of state programs.250  In addition, some petitioners take advan-
tage of EPA’s structure and notify headquarters of their petitions, suggesting
that the regions are failing to meet their responsibilities.251  In this way, peti-
tioners can use EPA’s own nuclear tool against it to incentivize responsiveness,
reason-giving, and substantive outcomes.
Finally, one benefit of the informality of the petition process as it currently
stands is the flexibility it gives EPA for addressing concerns and reaching solu-
tions.  The agency has a nuclear option, but all the participants know that
changes short of withdrawal are within the agency’s discretion.252  This may
incentivize a more cooperative series of negotiations than would be achievable
if EPA were to immediately initiate withdrawal proceedings.  If more coopera-
tive negotiations are likely to also be more successful — in terms of being
invested in the process as well as in reaching beneficial substantive outcomes
— then this facet of the petition-to-withdraw process may also contribute to the
legitimacy we observed in EPA’s handling of petitions.
B. Improving Inside-Out Legitimacy
Despite our overall assessment that the petition process works, we ob-
served several possibilities for improvement, particularly in timeliness and in-
creased transparency and access.  In addition, the variability of our observations
and difficulty evaluating substantive outcomes suggest the importance of future
research.  Ultimately, our results raise provocative questions about agencies’
ability to construct their own legitimacy.
1. Timeliness
As noted above, the timeliness of a process has implications for its per-
ceived legitimacy as well as its attractiveness to stakeholders.253  Our study of
the petition process revealed a concern, therefore, regarding the time it took
from when a petition was filed until EPA completed its treatment of the con-
250 See, e.g., Press Release, Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, Environmental Groups Request Federal Investiga-
tion Into Reorganization of Michigan DNR (Dec. 3, 1991) (PETN 012394; File No. 55).
251 See, e.g., Letter from Tarah Heinzen, Envtl. Integrity Project, to the Honorable Peter Silva,
Office of Water Assistant Adm’r, EPA, at 3 (July 7, 2010) (providing list of CAFO-related
petitions).
252 See RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 23, at 333–34 (noting that low likelihood of R
withdrawal highlights need for more graduated sanctions, and suggesting one option is to work
closely with states to help them meet the applicable requirements); see also Daniels, supra note
111, at 485 (suggesting flexibility and discretion to take intermediate steps is important for reach- R
ing outcomes under the threat of nuclear options).
253 See supra note 146.  Timeliness is an issue in many contexts; and we recognize that agencies R
have many demands on their time. See, e.g., Alan Kovski, Regulatory Policy: Public Citizen
Finds Deadlines Missed 78 Percent of Time on Federal Regulations, 43 ENVTL. REP. (BNA) 1700
(June 29, 2012) (reporting that EPA missed 78% of statutory deadlines).
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cerns. Admittedly, the petitions are aimed at broad issues that would predict-
ably take time to investigate, negotiate, and resolve.  Changes in personnel, and
administrations — both federal and state — could further slow the process.
Even so, it is expensive and frustrating for petitioners and agencies alike for the
petition process to be so long.  Ten years ago, one of us recommended that EPA
develop timeframes for itself within which it would investigate petitions and
make recommendations.254  The need to do so remains.
2. Transparency and Access
The roles played by transparency and access in facilitating legitimacy are
also central components of our analysis.  Reason-giving, of course, promotes
these norms and enhances accountability.  EPA’s record for each petition was
relatively good in this regard, in terms of transparency for the petitioners.  What
was lacking was transparency for broader audiences.  Most regions do not in-
clude information on their websites,255 and our dataset was built primarily from
documents available through FOIA requests.  EPA’s periodic reports to Con-
gress generally do not include information about state performance,256 and even
in a recent report by the OIG, only one petition was discussed.257
Ideally, inside-out legitimacy should facilitate outside oversight in addi-
tion to bolstering legitimacy in its own right.258  A central issue for the adminis-
trative state is who is watching the administrators.  In the cooperative
federalism context, moreover, the administrators include both EPA and the
states.  As is always the case, Congress retains the power to oversee operation
of the system it created, and it has periodically convened hearings to assess
performance of this cooperative federalism approach to environmental protec-
tion; occasionally petitions to withdraw are part of the conversation.259  We be-
lieve that enhanced transparency of the petition process would facilitate the
many forms of oversight that provide accountability for agency behavior.  The
variability we observed among regions, states, and programs suggests the im-
portance of enhanced transparency as a strategy to promote accountability for
different policy choices and to reduce arbitrariness.
Increasing transparency may also attract a broader set of stakeholders to
the petition process.  Most petitioners have been ENGOs, and we saw very
254 RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 23, at 334–35; cf. Knox & Markell, supra note 93, at R
522–24 (describing timeliness concern with CEC process).  The CEC Council recently adopted
timeframes in its Guidelines for the Submissions on Enforcement Matters Process because of
concerns raised about the slow pace of the process.  Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation, Council
Resolution 12-06 (July 11, 2012), available at http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=122&Con-
tentID=25243.
255 We uncovered some information about petitions on the websites of Regions 5 and 7.
256 Annual reports are available on EPA’s website at http://www.epa.gov/planandbudget.  A review
of the reports from the past several years revealed little mention of state performance.
257 See OIG Report, supra note 27, at 45 (discussing 2001 Louisiana petition; File No. 27a). R
Others have raised concerns about the lack of transparency of the process. See EIP Letter, supra
note 150, at 2 (encouraging EPA to develop online database of petitions). R
258 See Shapiro et al., supra note 231, at 496.
259 See supra note 31 (collecting examples). R
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little evidence of participation by regulated entities either in filing petitions, or
in negotiating outcomes of petitions that were filed.260  For those concerned
about industry capture or the disproportionate share of contacts regulated enti-
ties have with EPA in connection with rulemakings,261 perhaps the petition pro-
cess provides a small counter-balance by giving statutory beneficiaries a
different forum for voice.  To the extent one prefers that processes be open to
all, and believes that deliberations among a range of stakeholders is likely to
better inform decisionmakers,262 greater transparency — such as posting notices
about petitions and key developments in their treatment in the Federal Register
and including materials on agency websites — would facilitate more opportuni-
ties for the rich deliberation of many voices.
We highlight one additional transparency issue that relates to the legiti-
macy of the broader cooperative federalism approach.  Numerous reviews have
identified deficiencies in EPA’s oversight and in state performance, as well as a
lack of data from which stakeholders can easily identify and understand such
deficiencies.263  These challenges raise a question about the extent to which
significant deficiencies identified in other reviews have not received attention
in petitions. To the extent this is the case, it would be worthwhile to examine
why not.  It could be that the issues do not lend themselves to triggering via fire
alarm because of their technical complexity or for other reasons.  But lack of
fire-alarm attention could also signal shadows in the operation of the adminis-
trative state — areas in which transparency and accountability are not what
they could be — such that a lack of information was what prevented citizens
from raising concerns.  Process design changes to improve transparency would
be worth considering if these shadows prove significant in scope.
3. Variability
Variability in terms of how a process is used and applied can raise numer-
ous legitimacy concerns.  We note a great deal of variability in three areas: the
types of concerns raised; the statutory programs targeted; and the states and
regions targeted.  A full development of explanations for this variability is be-
yond the scope of our study, but we highlight some possibilities, and their im-
plications for inside-out legitimacy, here.
The variability in types of concerns raised by the petitions raises fascinat-
ing issues about how the petition process is situated within the broader regula-
tory context.  As noted previously, EPA has a number of top-down oversight
responsibilities even when states have authority to implement the major pro-
260 Cf. Letter from Richard E. Greene, Reg’l Adm’r, EPA Region 6, to Dan S. Borne, President, La.
Chem. Ass’n (Mar. 31, 2003) (PETN 00608778; File No. 27) (acknowledging correspondence
from industry group expressing view that NPDES program should not be withdrawn).
261 E.g., Wagner et al., supra note 152, at 143 (empirically describing contacts between EPA and R
regulated entities).
262 E.g., Seidenfeld, supra note 13, at 1528 (defining civic republicanism). R
263 See generally OIG Report, supra note 27; Markell, Slack, supra note 18. R
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grams.264  It seems possible that the variability in concerns raised might point to
weak spots in the federal-state relationship.265  Consider, for example, that con-
cerns about state legal authority were raised more than any other — and state
laws were often changed following the filing of petitions. Even though states
are supposed to keep EPA apprised of changes in legal authorities, to what
extent did the states do so?  And if EPA failed to discover those changes on its
own, then perhaps that reflects a weakness in top-down oversight of this key
area.  If the petitions provided information to EPA that EPA was not aware of,
the petitions would be serving an oft-touted, but rarely documented, benefit of
procedures that promote citizen participation and reinforce legitimacy.266
Likewise, the heavy emphasis on the CWA could reflect particular weak-
nesses in EPA oversight relative to the other statutes.  On the other hand, the
CWA, with its liberal citizen participation features and transparency with re-
spect to permit compliance,267 may be more accessible and familiar to prospec-
tive petitioners, making it an easier target than the other statutory schemes.  It is
worth noting that more citizen suits are filed under the CWA than the other
statutes, presumably for these reasons.
Finally, with respect to the state and regional variability, insights from the
cooperative federalism and political science literatures may have explanatory
power.  Certainly the cooperative federalism approach to program implementa-
tion poses management challenges because of the dispersal of authority.268  The
inconsistencies we noticed may simply be manifestations of these other,
broader challenges.  Regional differences might also be explained by differ-
ences in actual state or region performance; differences in state politics; varia-
tions in the organization, interests, and motivations of ENGOs; and the like.
4. The Need for Substantive Metrics
In addition to the issues raised above, we encountered an obstacle to fully
measuring legitimacy because of shortcomings in the metrics for the substan-
tive performance of the major environmental programs.  This deficiency has
two legitimacy-related implications.  First, fidelity to statute is of paramount
importance in the administrative state.  Although we were able to measure the
presence of responsiveness, reason-giving, and substantive outcomes according
to statutory goals, we were unable to assess their quality.269  This problem is
264 See supra text accompanying notes 103–106 (describing responsibilities). R
265 Alternatively, some concerns may be easier to monitor and raise than others.  For example, the
concern of inadequate legal authorities is a question of law that requires less factual development
than inadequate enforcement.  The resources available to petitioners may also contribute to the
variability we observed.
266 This information gap is also relevant to the need for substantive metrics, described in the next
section.
267 The CWA requires permit holders to provide monthly Discharge Monitoring Reports (DMRs),
which are publicly available.
268 See EIP Letter, supra note 150, at 2 (describing inconsistent treatment of petitions in regions 5 R
and 7).
269 For example, the efficacy of the 2001 Louisiana petition, described supra text accompanying
notes 215–221, appears to be disputed. See OIG Report, supra note 27, at 45 (discussing flaws in R
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pervasive: The GAO and OIG have continually found inconsistencies in objec-
tives, measures of performance, and results produced in the cooperative feder-
alism approach to environmental regulation.270
Second, one concern about citizen-initiated processes is that they can dis-
tract agencies from more pressing priorities.  One way to offset this concern
would be to put meaningful and transparent metrics in place.  If interested per-
sons had access to clear indicators of state and EPA performance, they could
direct their efforts more efficiently and, possibly, more effectively.
With respect to developing substantive metrics more generally, we ac-
knowledge that this is easier said than done.271  Indeed, it appears that the OIG
and EPA agree that, to the extent metrics exist for EPA oversight of state pro-
grams, those metrics are both poorly applied and applied to poorly chosen
data.272  But our study only highlights the point: problems with substantive met-
rics have serious ramifications for the ongoing legitimacy of the cooperative
federalism approach to environmental regulation.
Finally, these needs for further developments and research underscore
broader issues not just for environmental law, but for administrative law gener-
ally.  To the extent the agency here constructed its own intrinsic legitimacy,
what are the boundaries of agencies’ ability to do so?273  And within those
boundaries — assuming we can delineate them — to what extent is it norma-
tively desirable for agencies to do so?  It is our hope that this Article provides
both practical and theoretical perspectives from which to consider these
questions.
Louisiana’s program); id. at 69–70 (EPA response arguing significant changes were made in re-
sponse to petition); id. at 71 (OIG reply criticizing program even after state completed recom-
mended actions).
270 See generally OIG Report, supra note 27.  For what is only a sampling of others, see U.S R
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-422T, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: MAJOR
MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES (2011); U.S GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-1111R, ENVI-
RONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT: EPA NEEDS TO IMPROVE THE ACCURACY AND TRANSPARENCY OF
MEASURES USED TO REPORT ON PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS (2008).
271 For an overview of the difficulties associated with determining regulatory performance, and
suggestions for developing positive metrics, see STEINZOR & SHAPIRO, supra note 203, at 173–91. R
272 See OIG Report, supra note 27, at 14 (OIG describing inconsistencies in how State Review R
Framework metrics have been applied); id. at 22 (describing EPA’s concerns about quality of
underlying data used for OIG metrics).  Consider the following statement by EPA:
Complete data and valid, meaningful measures are key to understanding state perform-
ance.  Gaps in our current data make it difficult to develop measures that tell a complete
story across all media and regulated sectors. Limited resources at both the state and
federal levels make it more difficult to address these gaps.  Measures based on the data
that EPA does have may not focus on the right things.
Id. at 46.  With respect to State Review Frameworks (“SRFs”) generally, these may not provide
the depth and consistency needed to evaluate programs over time. See Email from David A.
Ludder, Esq., to author (Feb. 13, 2013, 16:01 EST) (on file with authors) (describing the SRFs as
having limited value because they do not address all program requirements).
273 For example, agencies may not cure constitutionally flawed delegations by adopting limiting
constructions.  Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001).  On the other hand,
Mead teaches that agencies may influence the scope of judicial review at least somewhat via their
choice of procedures.  United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001); see also Mayo
Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 707 (2011).
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CONCLUSION
This Article contributes to both the theory and empirical assessment of the
inside-out legitimacy of the administrative state.  It begins with the hypothesis
that many of the judicial legitimacy-forcing norms can be developed into met-
rics for assessing the intrinsic legitimacy of agency behavior.  To demonstrate
the metrics’ usefulness, this study both offers a set of such metrics and applies
them to an innovative citizen fire-alarm procedure that largely takes place in-
formally inside the administrative arena, with little likelihood for judicial re-
view.  The results tell a promising story of agency legitimacy from the inside-
out, holding lessons for governance, institutional design, and ultimately, the
promotion of administrative law values, procedural justness, and fidelity to
statute.
